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VOL. II

SECRET

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SECRET

VOL. II

FILE TITLE

NIGERIAN SITUATION

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SUMMARY OF RULING

RULING
GIVEN BY

DATE

TOP SECRET

16th April, 1968.

D/O

I have considered it necessary to bring you up-to-date on the latest developments, military and political, in Nigeria and to inform you of our efforts towards an early resolution of my country's crisis, despite the regrettable act of purported recognition of the rebel regime by the Government of the Republic of Tanzania. I regret to confirm that I have reluctantly broken off diplomatic relations with the Government of Tanzania.

Some of the unfortunate consequences likely to flow from the purported act of recognition by the Tanzanian Government are:

- (i) to give a fillip to secessionist forces everywhere in Africa, including Tanzania;
- (ii) to deter future unity of action by African States and the OAU which solemnly decided at Kinshasa in September, 1967, to respect the territorial integrity of Nigeria. The OAU Consultative Mission of highly respected Heads of State has, since its visit to Lagos, been actively trying to reconcile the rebels to the realities of the Nigerian situation and the needs of Africa;

/(iii)...

Addressed to All African
Heads of States and Governments
except Tanzania.

TOP SECRET

- (iii) to frustrate the OAU peace efforts and give Ibo extremists false encouragement to be exploited by enemies of Africa who have been aiding and abetting the rebellion with the supply of arms and the granting of various facilities.

The entire people of Nigeria deeply resent the action of President Nyerere considering the unstinted co-operation and help extended to his country by Nigeria when the Tanzanian Army revolted and Nyerere's Regime was threatened with collapse. Nigerian troops were sent to Tanzania in response to their urgent request to help to restore law and order. From our limited resources, we have also sent Technical Assistance experts to serve in Tanzania. Such friendly co-operation amongst sister African States which should be encouraged is impossible when an African country actively supports subversion and rebellion in another African State.

The bad faith of President Nyerere in seeking to perpetuate trouble in a sister African country naturally calls into question the wisdom of keeping the OAU liberation Committee in Tanzania since it has proved to be an ally of the countries and interests which have always conspired against the aspirations of the OAU and all the people of Africa. Considering the diversity of ethnic groups in every African country, it is tragic that President Nyerere should seek to enthrone the dangerous principle that the interests of five million non-Ibos in the former Eastern Nigeria should be sacrificed to the greed of a small clique of Ibos who also wish to impose their will on millions of other Nigerians.

As you are aware, Your Imperial Majesty, my Government in the face of mounting provocation and open preparation for war by the secessionist leaders used all its resources and energies to conciliate and to resolve the Nigerian crisis without recourse to the use of force. Throughout the crisis the Federal Military Government, in its search for a solution has held the following principles to be of paramount importance:-

- (i) that any solution adopted must be conducive to the maintenance of lasting peace. This demands that the solution must be to preserve one sovereign Nigeria and its territorial integrity. To allow the country to be broken up would be to condemn the successor states to the status of military, political and economic protectorates of neo-colonialist powers. In their acrimonious separation, such states would be goaded into internecine wars with the supply of arms and economic and social progress towards genuine independence would be arrested;
- (ii) that the solution adopted must not allow "tribal apartheid" through any specious theory of tribal protection but must, rather, guarantee equal economic opportunities as well as the same political and other rights for all Nigerian citizens, regardless of ethnic origin;
- (iii) that Nigeria must be restructured administratively in order to remove once and for all the root cause of political discontent - the fear of domination or blackmail by one large Region or ethnic group over the others. Hence we insist on the present minimum of twelve states.

We have, true to our desire for a negotiated honourable settlement, kept several channels open to the rebels; the OAU Consultative Mission, the Commonwealth Secretariat and honest friendly statesmen. We have canvassed these principles with the rebels through these channels in the hope that once they are willing - even privately - to accept re-integration in a united Nigeria and the new structure of twelve states, talks for a negotiated settlement can start.

There is every reason to believe that our efforts and those of lovers of Africa like your goodself are beginning to yield fruit. Notwithstanding President Nyerere's latest hostile action, the internal political and military situation in Nigeria is such that the

/rebels ...

rebels will soon, I hope, come to the conference table. Their capital of Enugu and other important towns like Onitsha, Awke, Nsukka, Abakaliki, and indeed, more than half of the East Central State - the so-called Ibo heartland - are under the control of my Government. The whole of the South-Eastern State which is more than a third of the area of the former Eastern Region of Nigeria has been liberated and the Governor of the State is already administering it from his headquarters at Calabar under the aegis of the Federal Military Government. Parts of the Rivers State are already under Federal control and Federal troops are within reach of the State capital, Port Harcourt. Other important towns in the East Central State like Aba will shortly come under Federal control. Thus, more than two-thirds of the territory which the rebels claimed as their so-called Biafra has been restored to the legal Government of the Federation.

Civilians in the liberated areas of the East Central State are returning to the towns and are receiving protection and succour from Federal troops. At the same time the Administrator, himself an Ibo, has been reorganising life and is winning back the confidence of the people whom Ojukwu's vicious propaganda has terrified and misled. Moreover, thousands of Ibos have been living in peace with other Nigerians in Lagos and elsewhere in the Federation throughout the crisis.

I can assure you that the end of the rebellion is in sight and that before long negotiations would start to find a lasting solution to the Nigerian crisis. I am sure I can continue to count on your understanding support in my efforts to preserve the integrity of the Federation of Nigeria.

I seize this opportunity to thank you, Imperial Majesty, once again for your support and understanding over my country's crisis.

.../With

With the highest esteem, consideration and fraternal greetings.

(Sgd.) YAKUBU GOWON

MAJOR-GENERAL YAKUBU GOWON
Head of the Federal Military Government,
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

K1V

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OBSERVER TEAM TO NIGERIA

(DELEGATES OF O.A.U.)

FEDERAL PALACE HOTEL, LAGOS

Telephone: 26691
Local 415 or 530

R. No. 2
22 October, 1968
Lagos.

TO: The Federal Government of Nigeria
The Organisation of African Unity

REPORT BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY TO
NIGERIA ON THEIR VISIT TO THE SECOND
INFANTRY DIVISION SECTOR

Note: This Report is not to be released to the public without the approval of the Federal Government of Nigeria and the Organisation of African Unity.

PLACES VISITED

The representatives of the Organisation of African Unity visited the 'Second Infantry Division' region from 14 to 18 October 1968. The group went from Lagos to Onitsha after a stop at Benin City where they were briefed by the Military Governor of the Mid-West State on the political, economic and social situation prevailing in the State with particular emphasis on efforts being made to rehabilitate persons affected by the war. From Benin City members of the group went to Onitsha where they were received and briefed by the Commander of the Second Infantry Division at his forward Headquarters. After the briefing, the group split into two: the first consisting of Commandant Sliman Hoffmann and his assistant together with the representatives of U.N. Secretary General, United Kingdom, Poland and the assistant of the representative of Canada, visited Warri, Ughelli, Ozoro, Kwale, Iselegu, Obiaruku and Abraka-Eku; the second group consisting of Brigadier-General Negga Teghegne and his assistant together with the representatives of Sweden, Canada and the assistant to the representative of the U.N. Secretary General, United Kingdom and Poland, visited Onitsha, Asaba, Ogwashi-Uku and Benin City.

The observers have paid particular attention to the

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conditions of the Ibos living in these areas and have been able to contact freely Ibos holding posts of responsibility in the civilian administration of the region, Ibo missionaries, teachers, educationalists in both schools and colleges. In all the places visited, the group of observers had received the cooperation of all people in authority and responsible people for a better understanding of the situation.

11 - CONDITIONS OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION AND RETURN TO NORMALCY

The observers have been impressed by the perfect conditions of the civilian population in the area visited - west of River Niger except in those places around Asaba town and in three villages south of this town where the activities of the dissident infiltrators have been recorded four months ago.

The observers have been equally impressed by the renewed intense school activities at primary, secondary and technical education levels. The observers recorded the encouraging number of schools of all categories operating in the area visited. It was noted that the majority of the teaching staff and school bodies are Ibos and also that trade has resumed between the North and the Mid-West. Factories are functioning normally. Markets are very active and well supplied. Means of communications (road, air, waterways, telephones, postal facilities, etc.) are all in normal condition in the area west of River Niger. Nevertheless, the observers have noted the partial destruction of the bridge on River Niger at the Onitsha end. This creates considerable handicap in communications between the two banks. Observers have noted with satisfaction evidence of great efforts towards reconstruction in the area from Ughelli to Kwale as well as in Benin City. Another indication of return to normal life is the fact that observers incidentally came into a village where the annual festival was being celebrated with pomp and pageantry. The arrival of these observers accompanied by Federal troops in combat dress has not given cause to any fear or panic. On the contrary, both observers and Army personnel were received enthusiastically.

III - RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CIVILIAN POPULATION AND FEDERAL TROOPS

The Observers agreed, on the basis of their investigations and observations, that in the areas visited relationship between Federal troops and civilian population who are not in refugee camps is very good. The civilian population does not feel the presence of the Federal troops.

IV - DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTIES

The observers have noted with satisfaction practical measures taken by the Government of the Mid-West State for the protection of properties of people who have abandoned their domicile as a result of the war. (See document in Annex). Several bridges on the Benin, Agbor, Asaba, Onitsha road have been destroyed by the rebels during their retreat. All these bridges with the exception of that of River Niger have been repaired. Observers have seen no sign of systematic destruction of property either private or public. However, for the fact that Asaba and Onitsha have been centres of prolonged resistance by the rebels, much damage have been done to these towns. At Asaba public utility services such as water and hospitals have resumed normal operations. Otherwise no other public services are recorded. For the fact that Onitsha is in the present operational zone there is no sign of civilian life with the exception of one refugee camp.

V - CONDUCT OF THE FEDERAL TROOPS

The observers have noted with great satisfaction the discipline and good behaviour of the Federal troops. Federal soldiers are active, and vigilant. It is to be underlined that the good behaviour of the Federal troops has led to an atmosphere of complete relaxation and free from fear among the civilian population. Wherever they went, the observers noted obvious signs of better relationship between the Federal troops and the civilians. It has been noted as in the Division previously visited, that Federal troops observe the Operational Code of Conduct which has been given to them and constantly brought to the attention of all ranks.

VI - REFUGEE AND PROTECTIVE DETENTION CAMPS

Observers visited two refugee camps, one at Onitsha and the other at Benin and two preventive detention camps one at Asaba and the second at Kwale.

ONITSHA - There are about 1,500 inmates mostly children, women and old people. All the inmates are healthy and well looked after. They are provided with school facilities at primary and secondary levels. There are religious services, a library service and about 460 students at both schools. There are 16 teachers and one librarian. All of them refugees. They have periodical medical visits by International and Nigerian Red Cross. There is shortage of medical supplies since these supplies are handled only by the divisional medical

unit. (Observers were interested to note that the Principal of the school is the former Principal of the Onitsha Polytechnic School). The teaching staff is paid allowances by the Federal Government. All refugees are given rations and cook their own meals.

BENIN CITY - The refugee camp in Benin City is actually a transit camp for 269 inmates. Inmates are free to leave the camp with the only condition that they must satisfy the authorities of their means of existence. Children in this camp attend public schools and colleges in Benin City and some of them at college level enjoy Federal and State Government Scholarships. Once it is evident that an inmate of the Benin refugee camp has the necessary means to re-establish and rehabilitate himself, he is left free to go.

Preventive Detention Camps

ASABA - The Commander of the Second Infantry Division, in his bid to ensure the safety of the local population against possible subversive activities of the rebels and also against eventual armed engagement between the Federal troops and the rebels has collected 2,126 people from the Asaba area including three villages south of Asaba town into this protective detention camp. The camp is well organised. About 400 children attend schools. Medical facilities and other public utilities are good. There are 14 teachers in the camp drawing normal salary. Living conditions are normal and the observers have been informed that as soon as security and personal safety can be guaranteed, these people will be allowed to go back to their villages.

KWALE - In the Kwale Prison, 120 people were collected from the Benin area and from that area East of Niger into preventive detention. Their living conditions are satisfactory. They enjoy good health, good food (3 meals a day). They have weekly medical visits from the Red Cross and are paid weekly visits by missionaries as well.

General Observation

In all these camps the observers have not seen any case of malnutrition centre at Benin where they noted a well supplied stock of basic foodstuff.

VII - RED CROSS

Observers visited the International and Nigerian Red Cross centres at Asaba and Agbor. They have been told that these centres are radiating the activities throughout the

Mid-West State in cooperation with the civilian and military administration.

VIII - CONCLUSIONS

No sign of genocide or systematic destruction of property has been recorded by the observers. On the contrary, they noted the progressive re-integration of the population into normal life and particularly of numerous Ibos who are also of Ibos who are resuming their normal activities in trade, farms, factories, schools and colleges etc. without any fear or complex.

It was also noted that there is a new political awareness as a result of the crisis and testifies a strong determination to safeguard the unity and territorial integrity of the country and a rejection generally all foreign interference in the internal affairs of Nigeria.

(Signd)
Commandant S. Hoffmann

(Signd)
Brig/Gen. Negga Teghegn.



12/11

With the Compliments of the
**PERMANENT SECRETARY,
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE**

Lagos Nigeria

A, 2/11



ARCHIVES OF O.S.

p. 175-101

all
13/11

pp. 176-181

The Representative of the Secretary-General to Nigeria on Humanitarian Activities presents his compliments to the Federal Military Government of Nigeria and has the honour to submit a copy of the Second Interim Report by the Representative of the Secretary-General to Nigeria on Humanitarian Activities on Visits to the Southern and Western Fronts. This is also being transmitted in New York by the Secretary-General to the Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the United Nations.

In accordance with the established procedure, the present Report would be released to the public simultaneously in Lagos and in New York. In this connexion it is suggested, if the Federal Military Government agrees, that this be done at 1700 hours Lagos time on Wednesday, 30 October 1968

28 October 1968

NATIONS UNIES
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SECOND INTERIM REPORT BY THE
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
TO NIGERIA ON HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES ON
VISITS TO THE SOUTHERN AND WESTERN FRONTS

Introduction

1. The Representative of the Secretary-General to Nigeria on Humanitarian Activities in his capacity as Observer visited the southern and western fronts during the period 5-18 October 1968. He or his assistants travelled around the Port Harcourt-Calabar areas from 5-10 October and again from 15-18 October, as well as touring the Benin-Onitsha-Kwale area during the latter period. They used the same transport facilities as the country Observers and the OAU Representatives.

2. In the course of short visits it was, of course, only possible to see a selection of persons and places, but they had the opportunity to visit the principal towns on both fronts, both divisional headquarters, most sector commands, many market-places and villages as well as prisoner-of-war camps, camps for displaced persons, relief centres, hospitals and clinics, and to interview people at all these. They were given unrestricted access to all places which they wished to visit, with only one exception - when the proposed visit would have involved travelling through an area subject to daily ambushes and sniper attacks and therefore considered unsafe. The use of English made it difficult to communicate with ordinary villagers and other ranks in the Army, although on every occasion there were English-speaking person readily to hand and interpreters available.

3. The accuracy and value of observations, however, is qualified by the unwieldy size of the group when travelling as a whole together with members of the press, and the mode of operation which necessitates military escorts and involves the presence of high-ranking officers. During short visits in circumstances, ordinary people might be reluctant to reveal matters of significance which they are afraid may tell against their own interest. The press group which has accompanied the Observers on every visit is well aware of these limitations.

Conduct of the War and Troops

4. The pattern of the war has varied greatly between different parts of the areas visited. The 2nd Division, which was responsible for the western front, had been mainly consolidating its position throughout the Mid-western State which

had been retaken by Federal troops more than a year ago but which was still subject to infiltration in some districts. It also held Onitsha, which was captured after three unsuccessful attempts and five final days of intensive fighting in March this year, as a bridgehead east of the Niger. On the southern front, the Third Marine Commando had been responsible for the capture of the key posts of Calabar and subsequently Port Harcourt, and had since been fighting northwards into Ibo territory, in the course of which villages and towns like Ikot Ekpene had changed hands more than once.

5. Both officers and troops made a good impression although many of the men in the Divisions were raw recruits, obviously inexperienced, who had come to the front after only six weeks' training. In every case the officers were courteous, well informed and showed punctilious attention to discipline. They were fully aware of the importance of the Code of Conduct and said that it was communicated to the troops in a language they could understand at regular intervals, in most cases once a week.

6. The commanding officers were at great pains to explain the Federal Nigerian Army's objectives in the present campaign, and insisted time and again that they wished to welcome the Ibo people as fellow Nigerians. Their attitude was reflected in their behaviour towards those civilians who had either remained in their towns and villages or who had returned after the fighting.

State of the Civilian population

7. Destruction throughout the area varied enormously from, for example, Benin on the one hand, which seemed barely to have been touched by war, to Port Harcourt and, at the other end of the scale, Onitsha where few buildings had roofs and virtually none remained intact. Most of the serious damage appeared to have been caused by shelling during the actual battle for the towns. At Owerri, taken in September, seven bodies were seen in the hospital compound; some had apparently been set afire others were on stretchers, but there was no conclusive evidence or information to indicate the circumstances of their deaths. The market in Onitsha, claimed to have been the largest in West Africa, had been utterly destroyed by fire, allegedly by the retreating troops. Although it was difficult by the time of the visit to attribute responsibility for much of the extensive damage, there were no definite indications

that purely wanton destruction had been caused by the Federal army. Most smaller towns and villages seemed to be largely untouched. In the west and east there was no evidence of serious damage to crops, although they obviously lacked attention in many places, but north of Port Harcourt large agricultural areas had been laid waste.

8. Considering the wide divergence of conditions, it is hardly surprising that the state of the civilian population also varied greatly. Life in Benin could be considered almost entirely normal. In many rural areas, for example those around Warri, the same applied. Life in Calabar and the area above it had also returned largely to normal, with the exception of the absence of its former Ibo inhabitants. Onitsha on the other hand and Ikot Ekpene remained empty of civilian life.

9. It is important to realize that the greater parts of the indigenous population of the areas visited were not Ibo, though many Ibo used to live and work there. The people of the South-eastern and Rivers States are predominantly Ibibio, Efik, Ijaw and others; in the Mid-western State there are a number of fringe Ibo groups, and the Ibo living west of the Niger have, in any case, always been to some extent distinguished from the Ibo of the East Central State. However, towns like Port Harcourt were said to have been about 90% Ibo before the war, and of Calabar's estimated pre-war population of 65,000, some 15,000 were Ibo.

10. Whereas large numbers of the non-Ibo peoples of the South-eastern, Rivers and Mid-western States had remained behind or returned to their own areas, there was hardly any suggestion of educated, urban Ibo coming back. There were some school teachers, priests and similarly qualified persons, and throughout the area above Calabar, as also in the greater part of the Mid-western State, schools were in fact functioning normally.

11. In one area complaints were made by civilians that their money and possessions had been taken by Federal soldiers; but a missionary who had remained in his village in the same zone when it had been overrun the previous week, affirmed that he and five persons with him had been well and respectfully treated. In the Mid-western State an extensive list had been compiled of all property left behind by

15. Relief activity as a whole was impressive, but present staff and resources were only just adequate for the current situation. Not only would it be desirable, for example, to feed people in the Uyo area twice a day (thus requiring an increase of 600 or more tons per week over the present delivery of 800 tons), but the anticipated increase in people coming out of hiding would make further extensive demands. The ICRC personnel had contributed significantly in both areas and were quick to respond to situations requiring their attention. On one occasion when the Observer passed by chance a small group of displaced persons in grave condition, whose presence had been made known to him and to the Red Cross only the day before, a doctor was already active among them.

16. The Nigerian Red Cross as well as the ICRC were working on both fronts and recently became operational in the Port Harcourt area also, where they distributed food and organized medical clinics. According to those concerned, the most serious need in many areas at present was additional drugs; the Red Cross, for example, would have liked to be able to help local hospitals by supplying the drugs they badly needed. There was also a growing need for increased supplies of imported foodstuffs and funds for the local purchase of food, as well as provision for much greater transport capacity. And for the future, requirements are likely to grow very significantly as the numbers involved increase.

Prisoners-of-war and civilian detainees

17. Prisoners-of-war were not detained in Onitsha or Asaba but after interrogation sent on to Lagos. On the southern front, however, there were prisoner-of-war camps at Port Harcourt and elsewhere. On the whole the prisoners appeared to be in relatively good physical condition, except at Port Harcourt where 10 officers and 100 men evidently lacked exercise and adequate sanitary facilities. This was brought to the attention of the divisional commander, and on the second visit the following week, improvements had already been made including exercise, and plans were being considered to move the prisoners to less crowded conditions. During both visits prisoners expressed the wish to be visited by the Red Cross. The impression derived from private conversations with the prisoners-of-war was of a positive attitude on the part of Federal military authorities. It should be noted that at the hospital at Port Harcourt, wounded soldiers from both sides were being treated in the same wards.

18. Civilians were detained in some places. In Port Harcourt some 120 persons were housed in extremely crowded conditions where they had been detained for a considerable time, some up to four months. Food appeared sufficient, but the cramped conditions and inadequate sanitary arrangements had contributed to their bad physical state - there had been several recent cases of chickenpox. When the situation had been brought to the attention of the military authorities, assurances were given at once that, within the framework of security, the detainees would be moved to other accommodation and visited by a Red Cross doctor. In the prison at Kwale, 120 civilian Ibo detainees were held together with 60 common law offenders. Their accommodation was simple but adequate, they received three meals a day and seemed to have good facilities for exercise. They were visited by the ICRC or the Nigerian Red Cross. The detainees had been kept for about a year, "for their own protection". At Calabar another 60 Ibo were also being held in "protective custody". Their physical condition appeared adequate but no specific cause was given for their detention, nor was its duration specified. The authorities stated that concern for their safety was the principal reason for not returning those Ibo to their former homes, mostly in areas inhabited predominantly by non-Ibo peoples.

NATIONS UNIES
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S.M.G. & H.S.

Please refer to your minute on p. 201.

2. The papers on pp. 169 - 201 contain three separate Reports :

- (i) The Report of the Delegates of the O.A.U. Observer Team to Nigeria in respect of their visit to the area of operation of the 2nd Division of the Federal Army, is on pp. 169 - 173. This area includes the Mid-West and the forward position at Onitsha.
- (ii) The Report of the Delegates of the United Nations' Committee on Humanitarian Activities is filed on pp. 176 - 181. This covers visits to two war fronts - Mid-West and Onitsha (2nd Division) and the South-East (3rd Division).
- (iii) A Report plus appendices compiled by the Mid-West Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Committee, on pp. 182 - 201.

3. The first two Reports have already been released to the public and given world-wide publicity. Both Reports are favourable and there is an acknowledgement in them of the efforts being made by the Fed. Mil. Govt. in dealing with the problem of rehabilitation and of restoring normalcy to war-torn areas where rebel infiltration has been curbed. The United Nations Delegates' Report however includes a couple of minor criticism of cramped accommodation space both for civilian detainees and prisoners of war in Port Harcourt and the inadequacy of rehabilitation operations in areas around Uyo and Ikot Ekpene.


4. The Report of the Mid-West Rehabilitation Committee is a record of what the Committee has been able to achieve in the fields of safeguarding the properties of fleeing persons,


the repatriation of displaced persons and resettlement schemes for the displaced.


(F.B.A. Conde),
S. A. S. (G),
26th Nov., 1968.

V.E.

Above comments on pp. 168-201
s.f.i. please.


sma 28/11


29/11

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C.R

pl p-a.


29/11



From:

The Military Governor
Ibadan

..... 19.....

Surf

Your advice & others please.

27/11

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA



Forwarded to

H.E. Brig. R.A. Adebayo,
Military Governor W/State,
Ibadan.

With the Compliments of

THE HEAD OF THE FEDERAL
MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF
THE ARMED FORCES

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
DODAN BARRACKS,
IKOYI ROAD, LAGOS

INWARD CABLE/TELEGRAM ACTION COPY

Oversea Communications Branch

TEL. No. 260 Date despatched 19/11/68 File No.

received 20/11/68

To External Affairs, Lagos.

From Nigerian Embassy, Addis Ababa

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DPDL M 2925

IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL

For Baba-Gana from Ijewere.

Following urgent message addressed to His Excellency, Major-General Yakubu Gowon, Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of Federal Armed Forces from His Imperial Majesty, Haile Selassie I received today at Embassy.

"His Excellency Major-General Yakubu Gowon, Head of Federal Military Government of Nigeria, Lagos (Nigeria).

Your Excellency, I would be pleased to inform that, in its continued efforts to discharge the duties entrusted to it by the Assembly of Heads of States and Governments of O.A.U., the Consultative Committee has agreed to send a high level delegation, nominated by each of its members, to Lagos and Umahia to hold consultations and to explore ways and means of ending the Nigerian crisis".

2. The task of this delegation will be to convince Colonel Ojukwu and his colleagues of necessity of bringing to an end the fratricidal conflict in the high interest of the Nigerian peoples and of Africa by the resolutions adopted by the last Assembly of Heads of States and Governments in Algiers. This delegation will also have the additional task of informing Colonel Ojukwu and his colleagues that all the guarantees that security and

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INWARD CABLE/TELEGRAM ACTION COPY

Oversea Communications Branch

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DPDL M 2925

- 2 -

the strict implementation of Algiers resolutions will be carried out by the authorities of the Federal Government in Lagos. "If the efforts which the Consultative Committee has suggested above give a possitive result, I feel certain that Consultative Committee could then meet to give final consideration to this tragic conflict in Nigeria.

3. If this approach to the Nigerian crisis is acceptable to Your Excellency, I would be grateful to receive in haste, your consent to the proposals. Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of my high consideration and fraternal esteem. Your good friend Haile Selassie I, Emperor.

Ends."

Permanent Secretary,
External Affairs,
Lagbs

All Governors and Members of Supreme Military Council

For your information and individual ~~collective~~ advice as soon as possible. I shall then reply to the Emperor!

H.F.M.G.

CONFIDENTIAL

201/4

SP/S.359/T1/4

29th November, 1968

His Excellency
Major-General Yakubu Gowon,
Head of the Federal Military Government
and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces,
Supreme Headquarters,
Dodan Barracks,
LAGOS.

Nigerian Crisis

With reference to your endorsement on copy of communication from the Emperor of Ethiopia on the projected high level delegation of the O.A.U. Consultative Committee to Lagos and Umuahia with a view to ending the Nigerian crisis, I am of the view that the O.A.U. Consultative Committee's proposals be accepted on the basis of strict adherence to the O.A.U.'s Kinshasha and Algier's Resolutions but my only fear is that this visit might mean stopping the war for a few days and this is not likely to be in our own interest. Honestly, the war should go on to enable it to end quickly.



(Brigadier R. A. Adebayo),
Military Governor, Western State.

P.A.

CONFIDENTIAL

2 November, 1968.



SP/S 359

*With the Compliments
of the
British Deputy High Commissioner
(J.E. SMALLWOOD)*

Pages 209 - 211 -

P.T. Odumosu, Esq., M.F.R.

*British High Commission,
Ibadan Office*

ARCHIVES OF OSCAC

Thursday 19 September 1968 Vol 80 No 2000

Kingsley Martin's souvenirs: Sir Harold Harbord's 560

Francis King discusses the memoirs of Joe Ackers

Margery Perham writes about the war in Nigeria

On 28 January 1968, Margery Perham, the first woman to be appointed as a member of the Nigerian Council of Ministers, wrote in the *Nigerian Tribune* about the war in Nigeria. She was the first woman to be appointed as a member of the Nigerian Council of Ministers, and she was the first woman to be appointed as a member of the Nigerian Council of Ministers. She was the first woman to be appointed as a member of the Nigerian Council of Ministers, and she was the first woman to be appointed as a member of the Nigerian Council of Ministers.

The war in Nigeria has been a long and bitter struggle. It has been a struggle for the survival of the Nigerian state, and it has been a struggle for the survival of the Nigerian people. The war has been a struggle for the survival of the Nigerian state, and it has been a struggle for the survival of the Nigerian people. The war has been a struggle for the survival of the Nigerian state, and it has been a struggle for the survival of the Nigerian people.

...was immediate—almost dramatic. I have known only too well what was going on in that African country. And yet it is hard for any of us—even for those of us who have studied Nigeria and worked in it—to get a really full and fair picture of the background to the immediate events.

For myself, I thought I knew enough of the matter to venture to write about it, on and off for months, mainly in letters to the *Times*. I have a very large number of Ibo friends. I had invited leading Ibo to meet people in Oxford and I had studied the really immense volume of literature in which the Ibo have put their case. There were two points which seemed to me to stand out. One was the question as to whether Britain ought to supply arms to one side in such a tragic civil war. Did this policy give us the influence our government was claiming for it, and, if so, what use have we made of that influence? These are still, in my view, very open questions. The other point which I put forward was that if the Federal government could not offer a secure and a viable existence for the Ibo within the Nigerian state, then this people had a legitimate case for coming out of that state. Secession is, not surprisingly, a dirty word in African political circles. But it must be remembered that the previous boundaries were all made without African consent and imposed upon the tribes by western powers. If, therefore, circumstances develop which make the association of widely contrasting groups intolerable to one or the other side, may not even secession be the lesser of two evils?

It did begin to appear that this stage had been reached when, under Ojukwu's leadership, the Ibo embarked upon the secessionist state of Biafra. There was the basic reason of the very wide difference between the way of life and that of the other major tribes in Nigeria. This difference had seemed to matter less when all the tribes were held together within the overarching structure of the British government. But with independence, with the full tribal competition for power and economic advance, certain deep rivalries began to surface. The Ibo are a very vigorous, very democratically inclined people, they are fairly well educated, they must have hundreds of B.Phils, and they are, for the most part, Christians, very largely Roman Catholics. They were eager to break out of their rather poor and restricted environment and to use the whole of Nigeria as their sphere of opportunity. Up in the north, the Ibo settled in the towns of the Muslim Hausa. The Hausa are a proud people with a long history and a developed civilisation. But they were cut off partly by their inland position and partly by their own conservatism from the modern forces which had begun so very eagerly absorbed by the poorer, more agricultural Ibo. The Yoruba too had their old and developed civilisation. They, like the Hausa, were grouped in large city-states; they were pagans until they began to absorb both Islam and Christianity. They were rich with famous chiefs, and developed trade and local industries. The Ibo had little or nothing of these things.

But in this most threatened division, lay the powder that some unhappy event could

ignite. And it came from the bitter and tribal antagonism which developed between the three main Nigerian groups: was this tension which led to the assassination in 1966 by Ibo officers of their Hausa Prime Minister, Abubakar Tafawa Bewa, the Hausa Premier of the North and the Yoruba Premier of the West. And in addition to this we must remember the Ibo officers also murdered a number of the fellow officers of other tribes on the same night.

It is necessary to recall this tragic event in order to show how the inter-tribal tension in the country grew more intense. The assumption of power after the murders by an Ibo military man, Ironsi, only deepened the feelings of hostility. He tried to impose a more unitary system of government upon the country and in doing this he stirred the fears of the other elements that there was going to be Ibo domination. For this reason, and also in revenge for the earlier military assassinations, he himself was murdered by non-Ibo soldiers. Events thus moved by ominous steps to the series of massacres which have still further darkened the first decade of Nigeria's history as an independent nation.

In these troubles there can be no doubt that the worst, though by no means the only, sufferers were the Ibo living scattered about in the northern towns. Claims were made by the Ibo that 30,000 of them were killed. On the other side, the figure is given as 3,000. It is doubtful if any accurate figure will ever be agreed. The already crowded Ibo country was now swelled by tens of thousands of the refugees coming down from the north, bringing their wounded with them and their stories of the events through which they had passed.

The rest can be briefly told. After the failure of a determined effort to make peace and unity, the Ibo seceded under the leadership of the soldier Ojukwu drew further apart until at last it reached the extreme of complete secession. Meanwhile another soldier, General Gowon, had become head of state. He is a member of a small tribe, and a Christian, and yet, since he counts as a northerner, it was hoped he would straddle the regional and tribal divide.

In addition to this he was known as one of the highest characters in the country, magnanimous. And he at once began work at conciliation. But the war went on. And the war still goes on, with the Ibo confined now within a smaller and smaller area, in desperate need of food and medical care, which heroic people of many nations are trying to supply, often at terrible cost to themselves. But this does not pretend to be an up-to-the-minute report. And I am sure that many want to try to see the whole situation as rationally as possible and to probe into the reasons for the tragedy. Speaking for myself, I had in the strength of Biafra's case—I had reluctantly conceded that here, perhaps, was a situation which secession might cure. The Ibo seemed convinced that there was a future for them in Nigeria: they even asserted that wholesale massacre was all they could expect if they surrendered. I therefore felt that I must go out for myself for the first time see the other side, the Federal side, and learn all I could of motives and of intentions there.

So I went. I was given freedom to do what I wanted, to see whom I wished. And this wasn't difficult. Indeed the central government is manned by men of too many different tribes and regions to have developed any close autocratic control of officials and politicians; or indeed of inquiries and visitors. I flew about the country to their centres and I was able to gain some estimate of how the present Nigerian government is handling the conduct of the war and the plans for peace. The fact that I knew the country and many of the personalities made access all the easier.

It seemed to me that a new spirit was being bred, an acceptance of the reason why the united Nigeria had failed and a new vision of how it could be re-established in new and better lines. There can be no doubt, of course, that the murders committed by the Ibo officers had caused a passionate resentment. This was especially true of their murder of their fellow officers and comrades. Some of those who survived that night of the revolvers in 1966 told me some terrible stories of what they had seen and of how they had escaped. But I think that this mood of anger and desire for revenge seems to be passing, at least in responsible circles to which I had some access. The war, however, is being pursued with increasing energy: less, I think, for vengeance than as the way towards peace and unity. It must be remembered that war on this scale is really a new experience for Nigerians and that the assassinations had a very destructive effect on the unity and efficiency of the officer class.

General Gowon has called in the political leaders of other tribes to advise his military government, and he has a civilian consultative council of notables to advise him. The main danger to Nigeria, as he and his advisers saw it, seemed to lie in the existence of the three main tribal blocks, northern, western and eastern. But Ironsi's plan of a high measure of centralisation had failed as a cure for this perilous tripartite imbalance. The new plan has been the division of Nigeria into 12 states—with a question-mark hanging over the

October 12, 1967



Helmet and tribal scars: a Yoruba soldier

proposed Ibo state. Nigeria, of course, has so many tribes that most of these states are made up of two or more tribal units.

The boundary allotted to the Ibo state is a denial of their claim to what, under British rule, was the old Eastern Province, a region running right down from the Ibo north to include a number of smaller groups living near the coast. These peoples have now been split off to make two smaller states, South-Central State and the Rivers' State. By this excision Biafra is limited to the Ibo tribes and cut off both from the coast and the harbours of Port Harcourt and Calabar. Above all, the Ibo lose the highly promising oil wells in the south. Indeed it is doubtful whether Biafra in its truncated form could be a really viable unit, especially if it had to exist alongside a resentful Nigeria.

I flew down to see something of this area. It is tragic to see the devastation of the old and historic town of Calabar, where fishing took place, and terrible things were done, probably by both sides. I attended the first meeting of the new State with the military governor sitting as president, and was asked to address it. I spoke of the energy and satisfaction of its members embarking upon this new structure of government. I paid my respects to the late Mary Slessor, who did much for the local people, and whose memory is much respected in Calabar.

I visited other regions. Above all, I was allowed to go into the areas recaptured from the Ibo and see the beginning of a new civil government there. This was really the crucial test, for it became clear that the Ibo fears of massacre and the refusal to surrender were mistaken. No more were being made—I saw them as peaceful refugees and to send them back to their homes. Ibo officials were being put in charge. And in Lagos a departure was made from the Ibo officials is now left behind and is going to deal with the problems of integrating the Ibo area

into the Nigerian state and society. Lagos itself I found thousands of Ibo working unmolested, even holding senior posts in the Civil Service.

But, it might be argued, it is one thing for the central government to have plans. How far can the old hatreds be exorcised from the people in general? even if the civil government is struggling towards a new, more efficient rule, in a tribalism may be controlled, what can be promised for the army? The new army made up of hastily gathered recruits are—there can be—no strong traditional soldierly conduct and restraint, and they can tend to work up an immense excitement in battle.

I can do no more than state that if the military commanders I met convinced that they were fully aware of this danger, that they are doing all they can to counter it. It must also be remembered that not only Lagos but the military frontiers are most heavily threatened with

from all over the world—above all, the energetic young men of the press with their cameras and tape-recorders. The government is highly responsive to this inquiry. I had long talks with General Gowon with many of the leading figures in politics and in administration. True, there is undoubtedly much resentment at the demand of the humanitarian agencies to open Nigerian air space, which is felt rather as a hangover from colonialism. But even this has in part been accepted and General Gowon has gone a very long way in co-operating in plans for the supply of food to the besieged—further perhaps than in any other instance in military history.

But nothing can minimise the tragedy which is being enacted before the eyes of the world. The picture—and it really is a picture—of millions of men, women and children being hemmed inside a contracting area, and suffering from disease and starvation, has evoked a magnificent response in practical action. It may be hoped that the story of the courage of those who have stayed in Biafra, or have flown in to land on the perilous so-called airfields, to serve these people, will be fully recorded for the benefit of history. But is it enough to admire the courage of the Ibo and their helpers? Have we not to ask whether this resistance to surrender is a justifiable position?

It is not for us to decide. But in the end, to which Nigerians still are our friend, we must consider the influence we possess. It is an unspeakable suffering to which I cannot believe that there is for the future of the world. We encourage them in a way now to be beyond. No one can guarantee a vast area, this continent people divided into. We only watch the leaders and give them what we can. We give them power.
London, 16 September

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA



SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
DODAN BARRACKS,
IKOYI ROAD, LAGOS

138-141

Forwarded to

SP/S.359

Brigadier R. A. Adebayo,
Military Governor of
Western State.

With the Compliments of

THE HEAD OF THE FEDERAL
MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF
THE ARMED FORCES

cms

x.a.

47/5 7/5

212
Yoruba Traders Association,
Calabar,
South-Eastern State,
Jusufu Lakanse,
Jusufu Lakanse Street,
Calabar.
RECEIVED 26th November, 1968.

Copy for information please. Eofck
His Excellency - The Military Governor,
South-Eastern State of Nigeria,
Calabar.



Petition for equitable consideration
Re general forfeiture of money in the Calabar Banks.

Your Excellency, 4/5. 359

We, the undersigned persons for ourselves and on behalf of all other members of the Yoruba Traders Association in Calabar of the South-Eastern State of Nigeria, have the honour most respectfully to approach Your Excellency through the medium of this humble petition appealing to the virtue of the prerogative and benevolent powers vested in you, and submitting our deplorable grievances as stated here below for your equitable consideration in connection with the above matter.

2. That immediately after the liberation of Calabar of the South-Eastern State of Nigeria, we as traders of the Western Nigeria origin (being of the Western State and Lagos State respectively) came over to Calabar under the protection of our good Military Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, with commodities including cotton goods etc. for the purpose of selling them as immediate relief possible to the unfortunate citizens and while the Government was at the same time doing a great deal of the relief in several other ways and means.

3. That when we arrived and started our trading business as aforesaid in Calabar of the South-Eastern State, we had upon our decision to co-operate sincerely with the Military Government as loyal citizens, actually approached the Military Governor of the South-Eastern State of Nigeria with sincere donation of twenty (20) pieces of cloths (of 6 (six) yards in each piece) for the same to be given to the helpless refugees in the area, as our immediate efforts possible. For the said efforts the said Military Governor graciously thanked us in recognition, and advised us to remain and carry on our trading business peacefully, accepting the Nigerian old currency notes as valid legal tender and without committing profiteering and/or any other manner of violation of Law.

4. That we came to Calabar when the Nigerian old currency notes were not yet changed in the South-Eastern State for the new ones (now in circulation). And as it happened that the money we received from selling our goods was nearly all in the old currency notes as a result of acute scarcity of coins in Calabar by that time, and as the said former currency notes were no longer in use in the Western States of the Federation - from where we used to buy the goods to Calabar, we were therefore always compelled by the problems to deposit into the Banks in Calabar all such amounts of money accruing from our sales - as the only alternative possible.

5. That our customers at home having been aware of the fact of the said then financial problem in the course of our business in the South-Eastern State, and seeing per our pass Books the undisputed and reliable evidence of our having left all the money in safe custodies in the Banks in Calabar, used therefore to continue to give us more goods on credit on our demands whenever we arrived home from Calabar, besides several friendly loans from our relatives and friends there at home, for the purpose of our continuing the business in Calabar. These they did with the understanding and unflinching confidence that they would certainly recover all their money peaceably from us when the Nigerian new currency notes would take place in Calabar of the South-Eastern State.

6. That as time went on, and as we continued to bring goods from Lagos and some other parts of the Western Nigeria to Calabar and received the old currency notes only, from selling them, and could not make use of the same than depositing them in the Banks in Calabar, we were totally embarrassed in mind and consequently became reluctant and began to refuse the uttering on our said sales - as we could neither take them to Lagos nor buy anything normally and happily with them in Calabar or any other part of the South-Eastern State.

7. That following the said refusal to accept the notes some of us were checked, apprehended and detained. But later we were warned and advised by the government authority concerned to continue to accept the said old currency notes and then deposit them in the Banks, in that we would certainly receive all such money completely and safely in the new currency notes which were forthcoming, and we promptly did so in compliance.

8. That when the Nigerian new currency notes were introduced the general public of the South-Eastern State was warned to change all the old notes for the new ones. At this juncture we were compelled to clear all our pockets and deposit all the old currency notes in the Banks without fear and for the purpose of getting them easily changed with the new ones. Since then we have been remaining almost totally stranded in Calabar, but for the help of the scanty proceeds accruing from the sales of the remaining handful of the stocks of our cotton goods.

9. That to our greatest surprise later, when we happen to go to the Banks in Calabar to effect necessary withdrawals of our said money in the interest of our business aforesaid and some other purposes, after the Nigerian new currency notes have already come into circulation and use in the area, we have rather been refused all reasonable payments but given the nominal sum of £20 (twenty pounds) only each, and the shocking and embarrassing remarks "ACCOUNTS FROZEN - BALANCE NIL" entered in our respective Pass Books.

10. That at the moment we have rather been placed under accute and very deplorable embarrassment and have not been able to go home empty handed as the kind customers from whom we received the goods on credit in our Western Nigeria as aforesaid are now expecting from us payment to them of the money in the Banks in Calabar.

11. That whereas as traders as already stated above we got by honest means of our trading business all the money we have deposited in the Banks in Calabar of the South-Eastern State of Nigeria, and NOT AT ALL by any foul means. We Yoruba people came to Calabar of the South-Eastern State as gentlemen traders after the liberation of the area as aforesaid (that is to say after the looting period). We therefore beg to assert in our humble and honest contention that we are not the plunderers who raided places and looted property during the arrival and operation of the Nigerian Federal troops in Calabar, and thereafter dumping into the Banks the money they looted and/or which they happened to realise from the looting.

12. That if the attempt to withhold our money in the Banks is connected with the alleged Government's move to check the sources from which the strange amount of money has been dumped into the Banks then we would certainly appreciate the measure for being expedient, and would also be happily prepared to appear at any such inquiry for the purpose of proving beyond all reasonable doubts (according to our plain and substantial evidence) that our own money in question in the Banks is certainly and altogether a result of our honest trading business and is not at all in the same category with the money gained from lootings and/or any nature of profiteering or any other unlawful means, during and/or after the liberation of Calabar.

13. That we hereby beg to make the position clear that by this humble petition we do not mean to challenge the measure of our Military Government but are as loyal and affected citizens of the country clamouring and submitting candidly our deplorable grievances for an equitable relief - pointing out to Your Excellency that by withholding our money as stated above we have been crushingly exposed to general handicap as our said trading business has been paralysed while our families at home and children in schools are suffering general disappointments besides the aforesaid question of settling our debts with the people who had been giving us goods on credit at home.

14. That we further beg to refer to the crucial point that in order to ascertain the facts in the matter beyond all reasonable doubts, and in view of the sterling fact that it is certainly usual and indeed a statutory rule both in the Military and Civil laws, to try officially any offender or suspect before imposing any appropriate punishment on him, a proper and serious inquiry should be set up and conducted into the matter of any suspicious accounts in the Banks, lest we and some other people would certainly suffer innocently along with the crooks. Your Excellency will, however, agree with us on this factual point of our humble contention, that the indiscriminate forfeiture of the money in the Banks without a thorough inquiry into the matter would certainly ruin the economic progress, and injure the feelings, of the affected innocent members of the public whose accounts in the Banks certainly come from several sources of their honest means of living (both before and after the 18th of October, 1967).

15. In view of the above facts we are therefore hereby praying Your Excellency to sympathise with our deplorable plight and to consider our humble petition according to the virtue of the prerogative powers vested in you as the supreme military head of the South-Eastern State of Nigeria, by way of equitably allowing or causing to be allowed the release to us of our said honestly earned money now withheld in the Calabar Banks of the South-Eastern State, for us to continue our trading business and several other purposes as first above stated.

16. And still, as loyal citizens, we hereby conclude with sincere expression of our implicit and unflinching confidence and co-operation in Your Excellency's Military Government of the South-Eastern State, and in that of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria - Major General Yakubu Gowon, indeed whose statemanship and spirit of Christianity the whole Nigerian public enjoy to-day.

Thanking your Excellency in anticipation.

We have the honour to be,
Sir,
yours faithfully,

1. Yusuf Alakere

2. JOSEPH - OJO

3. Matthew Folusho

4. S. B. Olu Kanni

5. J. A. MAKINWA

6. S. A. Ade

7. folusho

for ourselves and on behalf of
other members of the Yoruba Traders
Association, Calabar, South
Eastern state.

cc: 1. The Manager,
B.W.A., Calabar,
South-Eastern state.

2. The Manager,
Barclays Bank Ltd.,
Calabar, S.E. State.

3. The Commissioner for
Finance,
South-Eastern state, Calabar.

4. The Commissioner for Home Affairs &
Information, South-Eastern State,
Calabar.

5. The Administrator & Planning Authority,
South-Eastern State, Calabar.

6. The Chairman, South-Eastern State Re-
habilitation Committee, Calabar.

7. The Federal Head of State,
(Major-General, The Supreme Commander
of the Armed Forces of Nigeria).

8. The Federal Commissioner for Finance &
Vice-chairman of Executive Council of Nigeria.

9. The Governor of Central Bank of Nigeria.


10. The Federal Commissioner for Information & Labour.

11. The Military Governor,
Western State of Nigeria. ✓

- 2/16
12. The Military Governor,
Lagos State of Nigeria.
 13. The Commissioner for Finance,
Western State of Nigeria.
 14. The Commissioner for Finance,
Lagos State of Nigeria.

(For information and action possible).

I hereby certify that contents of this petition is the correct statement, opinion and request of the above-named representative petitioners, and that the same has been first read out and explained in pidgin English to their perfect understanding and satisfaction by me; and later also in Yoruba language by their Yoruba relative (interpreter) before subscribing their signatures and/or thumb-marks hereto, before me;



(D.M. Eno) Writer.
20, Eyo Edem Street, Calabar.
Clerical Fee - Ten Guineas.
25 (twenty-five) copies.

G. B. Ogunjana.
(Yoruba Interpreter)

Address:- 31 Macdonald St
Calabar

P.S. (P+A)

I think this should
be seen by H.E. if even
there is no action from this end.
D. 5/12

Your Excellency

may care to see pages 212 to 215 which contain a petition from certain Yorubas who went to Calabar to trade after the liberation of that area.

2. The traders have stated in their petition that they were paid only £20 out of the total amount deposited with their Bank, the remaining amount being said to be frozen.

3. The petitioners have done the correct thing by addressing their petition to the Military Governor of the South-Eastern State who can cause the complaints to be investigated and remedial action taken.

4. The copy of the petition is therefore sent for Your Excellency's information.

Akinyemi
(N.O.A. Akinyemi)

P.S. (P. & A.),

11th Dec., 1968.

SAS
12/12

SAS(A)

on 12/12/68

P.A.

12 copies
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R 11/12
CR.



With the Compliments of

THE DIRECTOR,
INFORMATION DIVISION,

Federal Ministry of Information, Lagos
Telephone: 21221, Telegram: VERACITY

SP/5-359

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Pages 219 - 242

D 18712

Sept. 245

219
CONFIDENTIAL



PSYCHCLOGICAL WARFARE

The attached paper on the above subject is relevant to the Nigerian situation.

Produced with the assistance and co-operation of the Nigerian Army, it is commended for the study and understanding of all senior Government personnel to whom the contents are restricted.

It is expected that further copies of this material will be produced and circulated in your establishment.

Sam Epelle,
Director of Information.

ARCHIVES

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

The need for senior civil servants to appreciate the value and advantages of psychological warfare is underlined by the immense issues of mass psychology and human relations that the national crisis has raised.

When hostilities cease and the guns are silent, the war of ideas will activate itself more than it has been engineered by the rebels or conducted by the Federal Military Government - and it is a war in which senior civil servants must be involved as 'commanders' in campaigns to reconcile the people and re-dedicate their aims to the nation's wellbeing.

How do we fight an idea? - not by mere routine functions, but through an understanding of our community and responding to its needs effectively, in order to give it a new social order of stability.

An idea can only be defeated by a better idea. The divisive and negative notions of Ojukwu and his rebel collaborators must be aggressively opposed by the positive ideas of General Gowon of ensuring Nigeria's unity. In consequence, psychological operations which can engage in the ideological struggle are the weapons which must be employed to win the struggle for a new and united Nigeria.

It was Napoleon, who declared: "THERE ARE BUT TWO POWERS IN THE WORLD, THE SWORD AND THE MIND. IN THE LONG RUN THE SWORD IS ALWAYS BEATEN BY THE MIND."

Modern warfare involves all of the instruments of national power. Military power is only one instrument of the many available to a nation to employ. Obviously, Napoleon knew this well. He was a military genius and a statesman, but, above all, he was an exceptionally able administrator.

Lawrence of Arabia (T.E. Lawrence), writing more than 40 years ago in his book The Seven Pillars of Wisdom, commented

2/that the printing.....

that the printing press was the most important weapon in the arsenal of the modern commander, because men were won or lost by ideas - and he led a successful guerrilla war which freed the Arabs from their Turkish overlords. Today, the printed word is partnered by the powerful media of sound (radio) and vision (television).

Lawrence noted that Arab commanders, in the face of a comparatively modern Turkish Army, possessing grounds of tactical importance and lines of communication, 'doctored' the minds of their men prior to battle as carefully as other leaders arranged their bodies.

The commanders' targets were:

- first, their own forces (to insure the proper motivation to persevere to victory);
- second, the nation behind them from which they drew their support;
- third, the enemy soldiers (to destroy their fighting spirit);
- fourth, the peoples of the Turkish Empire (to undermine their morale and break their will to win); and
- fifth, the neutral nations observing the struggle.

Thus, the broad target audiences were aimed at and assiduously attacked.

And it was the great Chinese military philosopher, Sun Tsu, who declared 2,500 years ago: "HENCE TO FIGHT AND CONQUER IN ALL OF YOUR BATTLES IS NOT SUPREME EXCELLENCE: SUPREME EXCELLENCE CONSISTS IN BREAKING THE ENEMY'S RESISTANCE WITHOUT RESORTING TO FIGHTING."

Now let us consider for a moment whether psychological operations are a significant factor in countering the rebels in the East Central State.

3/What is the.....

What is the most important goal of a nation in countering a rebellion or in counter-guerrilla operations?

The most important goal is to win the support of the civilian population. Within an insurgency environment there are three significant groups:

the government, its officials, and employees;

the insurgents, both hard-core rebel leaders and members of insurgent bands; and

the largest group of all, the general population.

Field Marshal Sir Gerald Templer, who defeated the terrorists in Malaya in the fifties, considers that the winning of the hearts and minds of the people in the area of operations was the principal objective.

What is the main problem in guerrilla warfare?

It is the same as that of the ruling authority - the earning of the support of the civilian population. If this support from the civilian population can be withheld from the insurgent, the insurgency is automatically suppressed, because the insurgents cannot survive without the support of the civilian population from whom they receive their intelligence, food, supplies, and recruits.

For one moment, let us consider the object of war, because the understanding of the object of war is essential to the appreciation of the role of psychological operations.

The object of war is to achieve national objectives - and, thus, it is political in character. National objectives can be achieved by changing the enemy's government, leadership, or system to assure the kind of peace we want. Military victory or destruction of the enemy is the means, not the end of war. To illustrate, let us consider the situation in the East Central State.

In the East Central State, who is our enemy?

Our enemy is Ojukwu and his rebel regime.

4/You will recall from....

You will recall from contemporary-experience that Ojukwu and his personal creation, the so-called 'Republic of Biafra' had adopted national policies and procedures (expansion of his territory of Biafra by force of arms, genocidal actions against minority elements) which were in diametrical opposition to the national goals and policies of our Federal Republic.

Once Ojukwu and his rebel collaborators are eliminated, peace could be established and maintained through the reorientation and re-education of the people of East Central State,

Do you recall Italy and Japan?

In 1943, Italy was beaten and overrun by the Allies, partly by psychological warfare tactics. Mussolini and his Fascist government were removed and Marshal Badoglio formed a democratically - run administration.

Japan, after ejecting General Tojo and the Japanese militarists, made peace with the Allies and under a democratically oriented government, its leaders pursued compatible policies.

Why do we not regard all the people of the East Central State as our enemies? The answer is simple. In war, we must seek more friends, and fewer enemies. If we are to undermine the enemy's will to resist, we must continue unceasingly to seek allies and friends among the people of the enemy territory. Did everyone in Germany agree with Hitler? Did everyone in Italy agree with Mussolini? Everyone in East Central State did not agree with Ojukwu and many of them have suffered for their opposition to his counterfeit regime.

On July 20, 1944, Colonel Count von Stauffenberg and a group of German officers sought to kill Hitler, because they had become convinced that he was leading the German people to catastrophe.

We know there is a high potential for resistance among people who do not agree with the system imposed upon them. These are our potential allies. These are the ones we seek to win to our side by systematic psychological warfare. Our national objectives can be attained with their assistance by explaining our aims and persuading them that their true national objectives and ours are compatible, that is to keep Nigeria one and indivisible. Nigeria's independence still represents the hope of the bulk of Africa. The ideas of freedom, justice, the rule of law and the pursuit of happiness, when properly articulated and presented in such a manner that they will be accepted will always have a stronger appeal than separationism, when the implications it really represents is understood.

The soldier's primary objective is to destroy the enemy's body, but, out of actions, the enemy soldier can work actively for us or give us valuable intelligence.

THE AIM OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS WHICH ENCOMPASS POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL ACTIONS, IS TO INFLUENCE OPINIONS, EMOTIONS, ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOUR OF FRIENDLY, NEUTRAL OR HOSTILE FOREIGN GROUPS IN SUCH A WAY AS TO SUPPORT THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE UNITY OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA, OUR NATIONAL GOALS AND OBJECTIVES.

Remember, however, that in a rebellion, the problem involves our nation's own people, not a foreign audience. Who must the government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria seek to influence? The Nigerian people in the East Central State, in particular.

Now, let us look for a moment at the characteristics of psychological operations. Characteristics of psychological operations are:

6/- ITS EMPLOYMENT....

- ITS EMPLOYMENT OF PROPAGANDA AND ACTIONS
- ITS ATTACK ON THE MIND OF MAN TO AFFECT ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOUR
- ITS CONSISTENCY WITH NATIONAL POLICY AND INTEGRATION WITH STRATEGY AND TACTICS
- ITS REQUIREMENT OF COHESIVE NATIONAL POLICY
- ITS VALUE IN ALL FORMS OF WAR - AND ITS UNIQUENESS IN COUNTER-GUERRILLA OPERATIONS.

Several examples can be cited where nations have been conquered by psychological operations.

Czechoslovakia fell to the Nazis in 1938 and 1939, as a result of political demands buttressed by the threat of military force. Austria was conquered by the same techniques in 1938. The Communists took over Czechoslovakia in 1948 by similar tactics. Thus, military operations will more frequently succeed, at a lower cost and in a shorter time, when psychological operations are employed to attack the mind and supplement the military attack on the body of man.

Psychological operations include both propaganda, the verbal aspect, and actions which are planned and taken for their psychological effect or impact. You may remember the Cuban missile confrontation of the Americans with the Soviets in October 1962. You recall that President Kennedy did not merely call upon Khrushchev to remove from Cuba the missiles and bombers which threatened the United States. He mobilised and deployed the military strength of the United States, an adequate force of land, sea, and air power, demonstrating a very real capability. Mr. Khrushchev, considering both Mr. Kennedy's words and actions, decided that it was prudent to remove the missiles and bombers. This was an orchestration of the instruments of national power and the deed reinforced the word. The word and the deed are, therefore, equivalent to the psychological warfare operator and can be utilised

7/independently or....

independently or simultaneously as the situation requires. If used together their programmes must be co-ordinated.

Propaganda is essentially an offensive weapon and works best in the attack rather than defensively, which means that it must be aggressive. Time must not be wasted arguing with the enemy propagandist, answering or defending ourselves against his attacks. This action merely serves to reinforce and spotlight his propaganda. Rather, we should seek out and press the attack on his points of vulnerability. If we can credibly demonstrate the falsity of his propaganda, we may employ counter-propaganda for this purpose.

Now, let us consider the relationship between propaganda and national policy.

Who makes national policy?

National policy is made by the ~~Commander-in-Chief~~ and the Supreme Military Council. Other interested government agencies have a voice and contribute to the formulation of national policy. The Supreme Council, however, is charged with national executive responsibilities and the conduct of our foreign affairs, so it determines our national policy.

Who makes propaganda policy?

Propaganda policy must be consistent with national policy. There can neither be independent propaganda policy nor propaganda independent of policy. The Ministries of Information and External Affairs, as the government's chief spokesmen abroad, formulate propaganda policy and guidelines derived from and based on national policy. Other government agencies take their cues from these guidelines.

What should be the responsibility of the Supreme Headquarters with respect to national policy and propaganda policy?

Propaganda is very sensitive to national policy and is damaged by inconsistency and lack of cohesion in that policy. It is the price we must pay in a democracy, for democracies speak with many voices, and consistency and cohesion is difficult to obtain.

Another characteristic of propaganda is the strength which can be generated from a simple, clear-cut, easily understood ideology.

In order for propaganda to be credible and effective, promises must be kept.

One way of classifying propaganda is by source and there is black, white or grey propaganda.

In white propaganda, the true source is openly identified, such as the Voice of Nigeria or Radio Nigeria speaking as the official organ of the Federal Military Government. Everything it says is attributed to the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, and there are advantages and disadvantages in such relationship.

Black propaganda is attributed to a source other than the true source, without the consent of the source to which it is attributed. A famous example is the forgery called the Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion, falsely attributed to the Jews, and used to justify pogroms against them by Czarist Russia and by the Nazis. Another famous forgery, the Tanaka Memorial, falsely attributed to Baron Tanaka, a leading Japanese figure, purported to outline Japanese plans for the conquest of Asia.

In World War II, a British journalist who had lived most of his life in Germany put a powerful radio station on the air called Soldaten Sender Calais. Purporting to be the voice of the Wehrmacht and representing the "good old German Army," it was designed to drive a wedge between the German Army and the Nazi Party and undermine German popular support of the Nazi regime. Using defectors and prisoners of war, and making 9/clever use of.....

clever use of all available intelligence, it played music Germans liked to hear, gave the German officials news and added items and commentary which were critical of the Nazi Party and leadership. This account of the effective use of black propaganda is contained in a fascinating book entitled BLACK BOOMERANG, written by Sefton Delmer.

The Communists regularly use black propaganda. Chapter 14 (headed "Psychological Warfare") of a very informative book entitled INSIDE A SOVIET EMBASSY, written by a Russian defector from the Soviet Embassy in Rangoon, Burma, Aleksander Kaznacheev, is interesting. It describes how black propaganda, planned in Moscow by KGB, the Soviet intelligence service, was used to poison relations between the United States of America and countries in Asia. Unfortunately, these poisonous black propaganda fabrications too often accomplish their purpose.

Grey propaganda is that which is not specifically attributed to any source, or which is attributed to a friendly source with the consent of that source. A rumour which has been successfully instigated is an example.

For another, let us say that friendly sources are concerned about the internal insurgency threat in their country. They wish to publish an exposé, but lack evidence and facts which can establish their case and render it more convincing, and appeal to our government for assistance. We have the information they need and could publish it as our own, but it would be less effective bearing the Nigerian stamp than if it were published by the local nationals as their own. We give them the material and they adopt it and publish it. This is grey propaganda. (Note that this is not a fabrication and that there is consent in the attribution. Our government is prepared to acknowledge sponsorship, if necessary).

Another method of classifying propaganda is by its utility. In addition to the use of propaganda in unconventional warfare and counter insurgency operations, it may be employed in general or limited war to support strategic, tactical, or consolidation operations. Strategic operations have long-range objectives and employ enduring themes like a theme or slogan, such as "To Keep Nigeria One Is A Task That Must Be Done".

Hope of eventual victory and liberation of occupied areas is sustained and the enemy's will to continue to struggle and pay the price is attacked.

Tactical propaganda is employed to support military operations and is aimed at enemy soldiers as well as civilians as the situation dictates. Here heavy casualties, poor leadership, shortages of food, ammunition, or supplies, or antagonism between enemy allies are exploited. Under appropriate tactical conditions, enemy soldiers can be induced to defect or surrender.

Consolidation operations are conducted in occupied or liberated territory to win the support of the population for operations and prevent interference with our military campaigns. As in counter-insurgency and unconventional warfare operations, work is carried out among the target audience.

Here are two examples which demonstrate how propaganda works in war conditions -

FREEDOM OR £3,000 BROADCAST

At the early stage of the present war, the rebels wanted to get possession of our MIG fighters. They came up with a brilliant idea. Why not offer £3,000 to any pilot who would defect and deliver his MIG aircraft intact to them? The offer was broadcast for several weeks over the rebel radio service. The offer was never taken up - and we were fortunate.

11/This goes to.....

(This goes to illustrate the sensitivity with which surrender appeals must be presented, it is obvious that a mercenary could be influenced by the propaganda).

In November 1944, the Germans were defending Geilsenkirchen, a strong point situated directly on the boundary between the Ninth United States Army and the Second British Army. The plan to take Geilsenkirchen called for a combined British and American encirclement, followed by a frontal attack. When the junction between the two forces had occurred.

Geilsenkirchen frontally, preceded by an artillery preparation which included 50 shells loaded with propaganda leaflets which were fired at the end of the preparation. The leaflets stated that the nearby towns had been taken and that Geilsenkirchen was encircled. The leaflet was designed to induce the garrison to surrender without a fight.

Were the leaflets and loudspeaker broadcasts responsible for the capture of Geilsenkirchen? Perhaps, only partially, but the town was captured after the enemy garrison had been placed in a hopeless position. The efforts of the supporting psychological warfare soldiers made the enemy aware of his hopeless position and suggested the solution to cease resistance. However, Major-General Alexander R. Bolling, Commanding General, 84th Infantry Division, thought the psychological warfare support was effective. "Paper," he commented, "is cheaper than blood."

REBELS USE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

This is done in several ways

1. TO CONTROL THEIR OWN PEOPLE.
2. TO UNDERMINE AND DESTROY NON-REBELS AMONG THEM
THROUGH MORE EMPHASIS ON POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION
AND PROPAGANDA THAN FIGHTING IN THE WAR AND
INTIMIDATING PEOPLE.
3. PROPAGANDIZE FEDERAL TROOPS REGARDED AS ENEMIES.

The rebels have for months used all the tools of propaganda and controlled education to indoctrinate their citizens, so that they would followed rebel leadership and accept orders and decrees without question. For instance, in order to ensure that the one Nigeria ideas and principles could not penetrate the indoctrinated minds of the population the rebels arrest anyone listening to Radio Nigeria to prevent this medium of communication from disturbing the indoctrination process. The end result desired by the rebels has been a largely controlled people.

A major effort is made to win the support of the people by use of persuasion; however, intimidation is used to force the co-operation of those who would prefer to avoid involvement. Those who resist these approaches are tortured or killed.

Propagandizing enemy troops was successfully employed by the Chinese in the Chinese Civil War from 1946 to 1949. Entire armies were persuaded to capitulate, were reoriented, retrained, indoctrinated, and fought on the Communist side. The Chinese army which put Nanking under attack on 20 April 1949, had been captured as a Nationalist army on 26 September 1947 in Tsinan, the capitol of Shantung Province.

Another technique is to destroy the soldier's morale and secure his defection by working through his family.

The importance which the Chinese attach to the subject of psychological operations can be deduced from the following statement by Mao Tse-tung:

MAO TSE-TUNG QUOTATION

"YOUTH IS A PIECE OF UNDYED CLOTH. IN THE COMMUNIST DYE MILL, WE SHALL DYE EVERY PIECE OF CLOTH RED."

13/Here Mao is.....

Here Mao is referring to the impressionability of the minds of youth. His target is not the youth of Communist China alone!

Now, let us consider the doctrine for the role of psychological operations in countering rebellion. Psychological operations are a major factor in preventing or countering subversive insurgency, because the key to success, for either the insurgent movement or the threatened government, is the ability to win the support of the people of the nation involved. This concept has been tested twice in history.

Approximately 185 years ago, during the American Revolution, the Declaration of Independence and the writings of Thomas Paine were important weapons in winning the populace of the colonies to support the struggle for independence.

One hundred years ago, during the American Civil War, the U.S. Government faced insurgency of major proportions. President Lincoln recognised the heart of the problem.

LINCOLN DECLARED:

"PUBLIC SENTIMENT IS EVERYTHING: WITH PUBLIC SENTIMENT, NOTHING CAN FAIL: WITHOUT IT, NOTHING CAN SUCCEED. HE WHO MOULDS OPINION IS GREATER THAN HE WHO ENACTS LAWS."

All actions (or inactions) of a government - political, economic, social, or military - have a psychological impact on the nation and its people.

There are four areas in which psychological operations play a major role and must be considered in countering insurgency or rebellion:

1. DECISION-MAKING
2. CIVIC ACTIONS
3. MORALE-BUILDING
4. COUNTER-GUERRILLA OPERATIONS

Since a primary consideration must be the impact of all actions on the civilian population, (as the people, themselves, perceive the action), all decisions must weigh the effects of the prospective action on the attitudes of the people accepted.

This applies at all levels of government and in each of the major phases of the counter-insurgency programme - environmental improvements, population and resources control, and counter-guerrilla operations. Ways must be found to minimise undesirable effects and where possible, put the burden on the rebels. This is, in effect, weighing the possible courses of action and selecting that one which will have the most favourable impact upon the target audience and yet contribute to the accomplishment of the mission.

Civic actions are themselves psychological actions. They are undertaken by military forces of the nation to provide visible evidence of the government's interest in the welfare and betterment of the people and, thus, favourably to affect their attitudes toward the government. Civic actions should be exploited by appropriate publicity, locally, State-wide and nationally, to create the image of progress, for example, building of Mambilla Plateau Road by Army Engineers.

Closely related to civic actions is morale-building. This means development of a feeling of national unity, of identification between the people and their government, and fostering confidence in the national leadership.

This requires good leadership at all levels, a genuine interest in the just aspirations of the people, constructive efforts to solve national and local problems, and continuous communication between the people and the government at all levels. The interchange of ideas and face-to-face meetings between the governed and those who govern can do much to build morale, develop unity, foster confidence in the government, and thereby help close the psychological gap which often exists.

15/At the same time,.....

At the same time, government personnel and the armed forces of the nation need to be imbued with a sense of mission and purpose and motivated to the high degree of resolution necessary to the job in the face of adversity and discouragement. This is basically a problem of leadership, with leaders at all levels supplying the why, what, and how tasks are to be accomplished.

Counter-guerrilla combat operations must always consider how to maintain psychological pressure on the rebels. Ways must be sought to make the rebels feel isolated, distrustful of the civilian population and each other doubtful of victory and question the justice of their cause.

It is always necessary to consider the enemy's psychological objectives in order to design programmes to frustrate their attainment.

The objectives of insurgent psychological operations objectives usually include:

1. IDENTIFICATION OF INSURGENT GOALS WITH POPULAR ASPIRATIONS;
2. DISCREDITING GOVERNMENT AND LEADERSHIP;
3. FEEDING ON PSYCHOLOGICAL WEAKNESSES OF THE STATE;
4. MAKING EVERY REBEL SUPPORTER AND SYMPATHISER A PROPAGANDIST;
5. DESTROYING NATIONAL MORALE AND CONFIDENCE IN THE GOVERNMENT.

The leaders of the rebel movement attempt to determine the popular aspirations of the people so the insurgents may claim them as their own. They will become "champions of the people's cause" and will offer any promise - false or otherwise - in order to gain the attention and support of the

population, for example, the creation of their own 'republic'. If it is an inspired, subversive rebellion, the insurgents will frequently recommend violent action at the appropriate time, in order to overthrow the legal government on the pretext of reaching the popular goals.

(Dr. Bernard Fall, author of Two Viet-Nams and Street Without Joy, has said that the Viet Cong have assassinated approximately 10,000 Vietnamese officials throughout the Republic of Viet-Nam during the past 10 years).

No government formed by human beings is perfect and none can answer all the demands of all the various groups within a nation. It is difficult for the newly-developing nations to meet the numerous demands and rising expectations of the people.

In this political and economic climate, it is easy for the insurgents to discredit the government and its leadership and to promise utopia, if the rebels are permitted to obtain power. The answer, however, is not so simple. The same basic problems of lack of industry, educational facilities, capital, world markets, etc., will remain. These problems cannot be overcome overnight by simply changing the governmental leadership.

In conjunction with identification of insurgent goals with popular aspirations, the insurgents attempt to exploit known psychological weaknesses of the nation. As an example, there may be wide-spread demand for probing the ill-gotten gains and landed properties acquired dishonestly by ex-politicians and public officers or for rationalisation of some excessive spending of public officers or for guaranteeing the safety of Ibos in Nigeria. If the people believe this is what they want, it may become a psychological weakness.

In order to increase the chance for ultimate success and to prepare the proper public acceptance of the insurgents they make every rebel supporter, and sympathizer, a propagandist. The rebels place more emphasis on political indoctrination and propaganda than on fighting in pitched battles. Also, they attempt to win the support of the people by all means from passive persuasion to terror.

The ultimate goal is that of destroying the national morale and confidence in the government. The previous four items mentioned are designed to create the atmosphere for accomplishing this final objective.

A government threatened by rebellion must analyse its problems and understand its tasks, if it is to develop a comprehensive national programme to prevent or defeat subversive insurgency.

TASKS FOR GOVERNMENT

1. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF THE BASIC OVERRIDING MISSION TO PROVIDE EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE JUST ASPIRATIONS OF THE PEOPLE;
2. TO MAKE ALL ACTIONS FURTHER THE MISSION;
3. TO PROVIDE IMAGINATIVE, CAPABLE LEADERSHIP AT ALL LEVELS;
4. TO MAINTAIN COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PEOPLE AT ALL LEVELS;
5. TO UNDERCUT INSURGENT PROPAGANDA BY A DRAMATIC ACTION PROGRAMME WHICH MEETS THE BASIC ISSUES ON WHICH THE INSURGENT MOVEMENT FEEDS (SAFETY OF THE IBOS IN ONE NIGERIA AND EQUALITY BEFORE THE LAW AND JUSTICE FOR ALL);
6. TO DEVELOP AN EFFECTIVE CIVIC ACTION PROGRAMME;
7. TO DEVELOP CIVIC GUARD/CIVIL DEFENCE UNITS IN WHICH THE PEOPLE PARTICIPATE IN THEIR OWN DEFENCE;
- 18/8. TO UNDERMINE.....

8. TO UNDERMINE THE INSURGENTS BY EXPOSING THEIR FRAUDULENT AIMS, LEADERSHIP, SUBSERVIENCY, AND METHODS;
9. TO ESTABLISH REWARD AND AMNESTY PROGRAMMES WHICH CUT AWAY AT THE INSURGENT ELEMENTS.

Psychological operations have been defined in this paper as any actions employed to influence attitudes and to change behaviour for the benefit of the sponsor. Whenever psychological operations are being used, one of the basic requirements is to determine the target groups whose attitudes must be involved.

In an insurgency there are three broad target groups which require ceaseless attention in order to create or effect desired change in attitude:

1. THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT;
2. THE CIVILIAN POPULATION;
3. THE REBELS.

There are, of course, many critical sub-groups within each of the major groups, such as labour, students, intelligentsia, farmers, fishermen, government employees, shopkeepers, ethnic, and religious minorities. To be effective, propagandists must know the basic attitudes and values of the groups on significant issues and tailor appeals to fit the specific audience.

The basic changes in attitude generally required in the military establishment may include:

TARGET THE MILITARY

1. CHANGE MILITARY PRACTICES WHICH ANTAGONISE OR ALLIENATES THE CIVILIAN POPULATION.
2. CHANGE ATTITUDES OF SOLDIERS TOWARD THE CIVILIAN POPULATION. (e.g. terrorising of Civil Populations)

19/3. SEIZE THE.....

3. SEIZE THE INITIATIVE -- PSYCHOLOGICAL AND MILITARY.

4. DEVELOP AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE MISSION.

If the military traditionally engages in practices which antagonise the civilian population such as illegal search and seizure, wanton destruction, an image of ruthlessness will be created in the minds of the people. For many of the citizens their contact with soldiers may be the only contact with representatives of Federal Government. For them, the soldiers are the government and the people equate the actions of the military with the policies of the government. Thus, if a young soldier drives his truck in a reckless and unheeding manner on the streets of the village or crash it at the back of any private car without regard for the safety of the civilians, he creates an unfavourable impression.

The basic corrective measure is to change the attitude of the soldiers to the civilian populace. This change of attitude must, of necessity, occur at the highest levels in the military staff as well as the platoon and section levels. Among the possible actions that may be considered are to teach the armed forces to treat civilians with proper respect, to promote the idea of providing the population with security, and to engage in civic action projects for the benefit of the population. These actions should be coordinated from the highest to the lowest levels in the military chain of command. Each military commander during the planning phase of operations, should include considerations of the psychological impact of his proposed action on the attitudes of the affected civilian population. As a result he may adopt a course of action that will obtain the maximum support from the population rather than their antipathy or hostility.

It is axiomatic that the spirit of the armed forces must be reinforced in order to convey a sense of mission and purpose

20/to their efforts.

to their efforts. They must seize the initiative from the rebels in military operations and retain the psychological initiative. The will-to-win must be emphasised and success against the insurgents must be announced throughout the forces.

In order to accomplish this, it is recognised that the troops must be properly led and trained in their basic military skills.

Finally, the armed forces at all levels must understand their important role in countering an insurgency and, within the comprehension of the officers and men, the overall mission and goals of the national government.

The basic attitude changes required in the civilian population may include:

TARGET - CIVILIAN POPULATION

(1) CONVINCE THE PEOPLE BY WORDS AND DEEDS THAT:

- A. THE GOVERNMENT PROGRAMME BEST SERVES THEIR INTERESTS;
- B. SOLDIERS ARE TRUSTWORTHY FRIENDS AND PROTECTORS;
- C. THE GOVERNMENT WILL DEFEAT THE REBELS;
- D. THE REBELS ARE DUPES OR AGENTS OF A FOREIGN POWER.

As we know, an insurgency cannot develop without the support (willing or unwilling) of the population. One of the basic programmes of the government must be to change the attitude of the population to the government, so that the people will actively support the government's efforts. The points above indicate some of the actions the government employs to change the attitudes.

Words alone are not sufficient to convince people; deeds must also be employed to provide visible evidence of the government's interest.

21/The government's.....

The government's psychological operations programme is all-encompassing. It should be considered as an entire package, not simply isolated actions, and must be carefully planned.

Concurrent with the campaign to convince people of the facts listed in (1) are the efforts to accomplish the following:

TARGET - CIVILIAN POPULATION

2. FOSTER:

- A. SPIRIT OF NATIONAL UNITY.
- B. LEADER IMAGE AS SYMBOL OF GOOD GOVERNMENT.
- D. DESIRE TO COOPERATE WITH THE GOVERNMENT.

The basic changes in attitudes generally required in the insurgent movement may include:

TARGET - THE REBELS

1. PERSUADE REBELS:

- A. TO QUIT - SURRENDER, DEFECT, ACCEPT AMNESTY, DESERT;
- B. THAT CONTINUED ACTIVITY IS UNNECESSARY, UNPLEASANT, FUTILE AND FATAL;
- C. THAT THEY ARE MISLED BY TRAITOROUS LEADERS WITH FRAUDULENT AIMS;
- D. THAT THEY ARE PSYCHOLOGICALLY AND PHYSICALLY ISOLATED FROM THE CIVILIAN POPULACE;
- E. THAT THEY CANNOT TRUST THEIR LEADERS, THEIR FELLOW INSURGENTS, OR OTHER MEMBERS OF THE SUBVERSIVE APPARATUS.

It should be recognised that that the suggestions listed under "Target - The Rebels" must be applied with great care, depending upon the circumstances of the insurgency. The major effort is designed to separate the mass of rebels (who may have been duped or terrorised into joining the movement)

from the hard-core insurgent leaders. It is obvious that any major success in changing attitudes among the insurgents can only occur once the government has seized the initiative militarily and is beginning to provide security to the population as well as securing the people's support.

The means available to communicate with target groups are:-

1. RADIO - TELEVISION.
2. PRINTED MATTER.
3. LOUDSPEAKERS.
4. AUDIO - VISUAL UNITS.
5. FACE-TO-FACE COMMUNICATION.

All communication media will be employed to disseminate information and propaganda, in keeping with the ability of each to convey meaningful messages to the appropriate target audience. Media suitable for one nation, however, may not be suitable for another. For example, radio may be limited by lack of receivers and power; printed matter by illiteracy or language problems; television to urban areas only.

Loudspeakers are useful in tactical operations. Loudspeakers employed from slow-flying, fixed-wing aircraft are very effective and can cover large areas. They, of course, must be flown out of the range of small arms fire and may require armed escort aircraft.

Audio-visual units can be used among the population to increase the appeal of rallies in face-to-face communications in an insurgency or for consolidation operations following capture of enemy-held territory in active war. The unit should be equipped with 16-mm movie projector, 35-mm slide projector, tape recorder, projection screen, public address system, and self-contained power source, mounted on a landrover.

Face-to-face communication, singly in small groups, or at mass meetings or rallies, is the most effective medium in counter-insurgency situations. In this medium, each individual in the audience is made to feel that the speaker is personally addressing him. The subject matter and the method of delivery are adjusted to meet the specific needs of the audience.

People cannot be expected to support the government, if their throats will be cut for doing so. Village civil defenders must be organised to commit the people on the side of the government and to provide for their common defence, when the security situation permits federal troops to leave.

Psychological operations do not provide a panacea for solving problems but it is an effective weapon for use in war environments and this paper is, in consequence, commended for your keen study and understanding.

ARCHIVES

SAS(G)

Twelve (12) copies of pp 219-242 were received under the complimentary slip at p. 218

2. I submit, abc, six (6) copies of the documents for distribution. The remaining five (5) copies are in the registry pending further instruction as to their distribution pl.

R 13/12/68
UR

244
S.M.G. & H.S.,

Please see on pages 220-242 the propaganda material on Psychological Warfare in the context of the Civil War which was forwarded under cover of the Director of Federal Information Department's complimentary slip on page 218, and the circular letter on page 219.

2. It (the propaganda material) is said to be "commended for the study and understanding of all senior Government personnel to whom the contents are restricted".

3. I suggest that we forward a copy each to Heads of Departments with a request that it be circulated to all senior staff in their Ministry/Department. We already have 12 copies of the material, and we will probably have to reproduce about six more copies.

4. Do you approve of this course of action, please?


(F.B.A. Conde),
S.A.S.(G.),

16 /12/68.

Yes pls.

18/12

SECRET

SP/S.359/245

245
19 December, 1968.

The Director of Information,
Federal Ministry of Information,
Lagos.

Psychological Warfare

P-218
I am directed to refer to the cyclostyled pamphlet on the above subject matter, which was forwarded to this Office under cover of your complimentary slip, and to request that you let us have six more copies of the pamphlet.


(F.B.A. Conde),
for Secretary to the Military
Government.

SECRET

pl 'bi' ea 22/1/69


19/12/68

Issued
19/12/68

P. 255

13 DEC. 1968

VS 319 1968

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VERBATIM SERVICE VS319/68

THURSDAY

12TH DECEMBER 1968

NIGERIA: FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF EXTRACTS ON NIGERIA FROM SPEECH BY
FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY IN THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS DEBATE IN
HOUSE OF COMMONS ON 12 DECEMBER.

MR. STEWART.....WE HAVE TO RECOGNISE THAT THIS IS A LARGE
AND FULLY INDEPENDENT COUNTRY AND A PARTNER IN THE COMMONWEALTH.
WE CANNOT CLAIM TO ORDER ITS AFFAIRS. BUT WHILE ITS AFFAIRS TAKE
THIS PRESENT TRAGIC FORM, THERE IS NO PARLIAMENT OR COUNTRY IN THE
WORLD WHICH CANNOT FAIL TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT THEM, CANNOT FAIL
TO EXPRESS THAT CONCERN AND TRY TO SEEK A SOLUTION.

WE HAVE TO REMEMBER, TOO, THAT WEIGHED AGAINST EACH OTHER IN
THIS CONFLICT THERE IS, ON THE ONE HAND, THE DREAD OF SOME OF THE
IBO PEOPLE ABOUT WHAT THEIR SITUATION MIGHT BE IN A UNITED NIGERIA,
THOUGH I BELIEVE THAT THE EVIDENCE IS NOW OVERWHELMING THAT,
FORTUNATELY, THEIR FEARS WOULD NOT BE JUSTIFIED. UNHAPPILY, THEY
ARE STILL THERE. AGAINST THAT WE HAVE TO WEIGH THE FACT WHICH IS
VERY MUCH IN MIND IN THE STATES AND THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN
UNITY THAT TRIBAL SECESSION COULD BE THE ROAD TO DISASTER NOT ONLY
FOR NIGERIA BUT FOR AFRICA AS A WHOLE. THIS GREAT ISSUE IS INVOLVED,
AND NO ATTEMPT CAN BE MADE TO JUDGE THE PROBLEM IF ONE NEGLECTS
THAT ISSUE, WHICH IS OF SO MUCH CONCERN TO AFRICANS.

THIS MEANS THAT IN ANY STEPS THAT WE TAKE WE MUST ENDEAVOUR
TO WORK BOTH WITH NIGERIA AND WITH THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY.
ABOVE ALL, WE MUST AVOID ANY POSTURE WHICH WOULD ENABLE IT TO BE
SAID THAT WE ARE THE FORMER IMPERIAL POWER INTERFERING. WE HAVE TO
A NATION CONCERNED AS A MATTER OF

2
AMONG ALL THE DIFFERENCES OF OPINION THAT ARE EXPRESSED I BELIEVE THAT THE UNIVERSAL CONCERN NOWSIS WITH RELIEF FOR THE STARVING AND WITH SUCH PROGRESS AS CAN BE MADE TOWARDS A CEASEFIRE AS WILL ENABLE RELIEF FOR THE STARVING TO OCCUR. IT IS THAT, THEREFORE, ON WHICH I WANT TO CONCENTRATE.

FIRST AND FOREMOST WITH REGARD TO RELIEF, AS THE HOUSE KNOWS, BRITAIN HAS ALREADY CONTRIBUTED POUNDSSTERLING250,000. LAST MONTH, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS ISSUED AN APPEAL. M.RUEGGER OF THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS WAS IN THIS COUNTRY RECENTLY AND HE DISCUSSED THE MATTER WITH MY RIGHT HON FRIEND THE PRIME MINISTER. THE GOVERNMENT HAVE DECIDED THEREFORE, SUBJECT TO THE APPROVAL OF PARLIAMENT, TO MAKE A FURTHER GIFT OF POUNDSSTERLING700,000. THAT WILL BRING OUR TOTAL CONTRIBUTION TO NEARLY POUNDSSTERLINGONE MILLION. THE NECESSARY SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATE WILL BE PUT BEFORE PARLIAMENT IN DUE COURSE. MEANWHILE, IF NECESSARY, PAYMENT WILL BE MADE OUT OF THE CIVIL CONTINGENCIES FUND.

OF COURSE, IT IS NOT ENOUGH TO PROVIDE THE FUNDS. WE HAVE TO FIND AN ANSWER TO THE PROBLEMS OF HOW TO GET IN THE FOOD. THIS HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH AN EYE BOTH TO AN AIRLIFT OR AIR DROP AND TO A LAND CORRIDOR. THE RIGHT HON GENTLEMAN ASKED ME IF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAVE AGREED TO DAYLIGHT FLIGHTS OF RELIEF INTO REBEL-HELD TERRITORY. THE ANSWER TO THAT IS YES, AND RECENTLY THEY HAVE CONFIRMED THEIR CONSENT TO THESE. UNHAPPILY, I HAVE TO TELL THE HOUSE THAT COLONEL OJUKWU STILL MAINTAINS HIS OBJECTIONS TO DAYLIGHT FLIGHTS. WHILE WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO USE THE ROYAL AIR FORCE TO ASSIST IN AN AIRLIFT OR AIR DROP, I THINK THAT THE HOUSE WILL ACCEPT THAT WE COULD NOT DO THAT UNLESS WE HAD THE ASSURANCE THAT BOTH SIDES WERE PREPARED TO ALLOW THESE FLIGHTS TO GO ON IN SAFETY. I WILL DEVELOP THIS POINT A LITTLE FURTHER LATER ON. WE ARE SEEKING TO GET IN TOUCH WITH ALL THE PERSONS CONCERNED IN THE MATTER TO SEE IF THIS NECESSARY DEGREE OF CONSENT CAN BE OBTAINED. IF IT IS, WE SHALL NOT BE BACKWARD IN PROVIDING THE MEANS FOR AN AIRLIFT. HOWEVER, WERE ALL THAT DONE, IT WOULD STILL REMAIN TRUE THAT IT COULD NOT PROVIDE SUPPLIES ON ANYTHING LIKE THE SCALE NEEDED FOR THE TRAGEDY.

13
I HAVE HEARD IT ARGUED THAT SOME OF THE FIGURES OF DEATHS FROM STARVATION WHICH HAVE BEEN QUOTED SO FAR HAVE BEEN EXAGGERATED. I HOPE AND BELIEVE THAT THAT IS TRUE. BUT, EVEN WHEN ALLOWANCE HAS BEEN MADE FOR THAT, ALREADY THERE IS A GREAT TRAGEDY OCCURRING AND AN EVEN GREATER ONE LOOMING UP IN THE MONTHS AHEAD UNLESS FOOD CAN BE GOT IN BY A LAND CORRIDOR.

3
248
HERE AGAIN, I HAVE TO TELL THE HOUSE THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AGREED SOME TIME AGO TO WHAT WERE CALLED MERCY CORRIDORS TO GET FOOD IN BY LAND. I BELIEVE THAT THE CONCERN OF COLONEL OJUKWU IS THAT, IF THERE WERE SUCH CORRIDORS, THEY MIGHT BE USED FOR A SUDDEN MILITARY INCURSION INTO THE TERRITORY WHICH HE NOW HOLDS. WHETHER OR NOT WE THINK THAT IT IS REASONABLE TO MAINTAIN THAT OBJECTION IN THE FACE OF STARVING PEOPLE - AND I AM NOT SURE THAT IT IS - WE MUST SEE IF WE CAN TRY TO OVERCOME IT. MY NOBLE AND RIGHT HONOURABLE FRIEND THE LORD SHEPHERD IS NOW IN LAGOS, AND ONE OF THE MATTERS WHICH HE WILL BE DISCUSSING IS THE POSSIBILITY OF ARRANGING SOME KIND OF INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARD TO MAKE SURE THAT THERE IS A MERCY CORRIDOR FOR FOOD AND THAT COLONEL OJUKWU IS SUFFICIENTLY CONFIDENT THAT IT WILL NOT BE USED FOR MILITARY PURPOSES, THAT HE WILL BE ABLE AT LONG LAST TO CONSENT TO THIS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL STEP IF FAMINE IS TO BE STOPPED AND GREATER FAMINE AVERTED.

THE HOUSE WILL UNDERSTAND THAT MUCH STILL DEPENDS ON THE ATTITUDE OF COLONEL OJUKWU. WE HAVE ASKED, AND SHALL CONTINUE TO ASK, ALL THOSE WHO ARE IN CONTACT WITH HIM TO GET HIM TO MODIFY HIS ATTITUDE ON THESE MATTERS AND NOT - I AM AFRAID I MUST PUT IT THIS WAY - TO HOLD HIS PEOPLE TO RANSOM.

I HAVE REFERRED TO MY NOBLE FRIEND'S VISIT TO LAGOS. THAT IS CONCERNED NOT ONLY WITH MATTERS AFFECTING RELIEF, BUT WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF A CEASE FIRE. I AM NOT IN A POSITION - AND I DO NOT THINK THAT THE HOUSE WOULD PRESS ME - TO SAY VERY MUCH ABOUT THE CONVERSATIONS SO FAR. IT IS NOT THE FIRST TIME THAT THIS COUNTRY HAS BEEN ACTIVE IN TRYING TO GET A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM. THERE WERE THE DISCUSSIONS AT KAMPALA AND AT ABURI BEFORE THAT. WE HAVE MADE EFFORTS JOINTLY WITH THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY. WE HAVE ALREADY MADE IT CLEAR THAT IF, AS A NECESSARY CONDITION TO A CEASE FIRE AND ENDING THE WAR, THERE MUST BE SOME PEACE KEEPING FORCE TO GIVE ASSURANCE TO THE IBO PEOPLE AGAINST THE FEARS THAT THEY ENTERTAIN, WE ARE READY TO TAKE PART IN THE PROVISION AND ORGANISING OF SUCH A FORCE.

7-
L WHILE THE NOBLE LORD LORD SHEPHERD, IS IN LAGOS AND SINCE, AS
I STRESSED EARLIER, IT IS VITAL TO ACT IN CONCERT WITH THE
ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY AND TO RECOGNISE HOW MUCH THIS
MATTER MEANS TO ALL AFRICA, MY HONOURABLE FRIEND THE UNDER-
SECRETARY VISITED ADDIS ABABA. AGAIN I CANNOT GO INTO DETAIL,
BUT HE HAS HAD ENCOURAGING TALKS WITH THE EMPEROR OF ETHIOPIA
AND WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICANN
UNITY. 249

ON THE TWO ISSUES OF RELIEF AND THE PROMOTION OF A CEASE FIRE,
I BELIEVE THAT THIS COUNTRY IS FULFILLING ITS RESPONSIBILITIES AND
DUTY TO HUMANITY. BUT I WANT TO RAISE ONE OTHER POINT ABOUT WHICH
MANY RIGHT HONOURABLE AND HONOURABLE MEMBERS ON BOTH SIDES OF
THE HOUSE ARE CONCERNED. THE RIGHT HONOURABLE MEMBER FOR KINROSS
AND WEST PERTHSHIRE (SIR ALEC DOUGLAS-HOME) RAISZD
THE QUESTION OF SINGLE HANDED ACTION BY THE GOVERNMENT TO STOP
THE SUPPLY OF ARMS. I RECOGNISE THAT THIS MATTER IS BOUND
TO EVOKE STRONG FEELING. I BELIEVE THAT IF WE ARE TO GET IT RIGHT WE
HAVE TO BEGIN BY ACCEPTING ALL ROUND THAT, WHATEVER OUR
DIFFERING VIEWS ON THE MATTER, WE ALL WANT TO TAKE THE KIND OF
ACTION THAT WILL AVERT FAMINE AND BRING A STOP TO MISERY. THERE
ARE GENUINE DIFFERENCES OF OPINION ABOUT THE EFFECTS OF
PARTICULAR KINDS OF ACTION. THAT IS WHY I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE
WRONG TO ADVOCATE THE SINGLE HANDED STOPPING OF THE SUPPLY OF
ARMS BY THIS COUNTRY.

BUT THERE IS A FURTHER PROPOSITION: AN ATTEMPT TO GET UNIVERSAL
STOPPING OF THE SUPPLY OF ARMS. I HAVE EXPLAINED TO THE HOUSE
BEFORE THAT, WHILE THIS IS BY NO MEANS AN IMPOSSIBLE CONCEPT, IT IS
AN EXTREMELY DIFFICULT ONE. NO MULTILATERAL CONTROL OF ARMS WOULD
BE SATISFACTORY OR WOULD ACHIEVE THE OBJECT WHICH SO MANY RIGHT
HONOURABLE AND HONOURABLE MEMBERS HAVE BEEN PURSUING UNLESS IT WAS
EFFECTIVE IN CONTROLLING PRIVATE SHIPMENTS AS WELL AS THOSE APPROVED
BY GOVERNMENTS. THAT MUST BE ACCEPTED IF WE WANT TO GET AN ALL
ROUND STOPPAGE OF ARMS GOING IN. IT WOULD MEAN THAT GOVERNMENTS
WOULD BE REQUIRED TO TAKE NOT MERELY THE NEGATIVE ACTION OF
STOPPING THE SUPPLY OF ARMS THEMSELVES, BUT THE POSITIVE ACTION
OF PREVENTING, SO FAR AS IT WAS IN THEIR POWER OR THAT OF THEIR
TERRITORIES, PRIVATE PERSONS SENDING ARMS. IF A CEASE FIRE AND A
MEETING OF BOTH SIDES SEEMS TO BE WITHIN REACH, I BELIEVE THAT IN
THAT CONTEXT THERE WOULD BE THE POSSIBILITY OF GETTING MULTILATERAL
CONTROL OF ARMS AND SO ACHIEVE THE OBJECTS WHICH SO MANY RIGHT
HONOURABLE AND HONOURABLE MEMBERS HAVE IN MIND.

5

RU IED

EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE

AAOULD

REGARD THIS AS A HOSTILE MOVE, AND A MOVE HELPFUL TO THE IDEA OF TRIBAL SECESSION. IT WOULD NOT MATTER WHETHER THAT WAS A JUSTIFIED SUSPICION. THE FACT THAT THE SUSPICION WAS THERE MIGHT DO GREAT DAMAGE. DESPITE THE AGREEABLE PROSPECT OF APPEARING TO HAVE TRIED TO MAKE PEACE, I COULD NOT TAKE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF DOING SOMETHING WHICH WOULD BE MORE LIKELY TO MAKE THE SITUATION WORSE.

HAVING SAID THAT, I ASK RIGHT HON AND HON MEMBERS TO REALISE THAT WE ARE NOW IN THE MIDDLE OF ONE OF SEVERAL MOVES TO TRY TO GET AGAIN THE IDEA OF A CEASE FIRE AND A MEETING OF THE TWO SIDES. IF WE CAN MAKE PROGRESS IN THAT RESPECT, THE OBJECTIVE ABOUT WHICH I HAVE JUST BEEN SPEAKING MAY BE MORE EASILY IN REACH. I HAVE TRIED TO STATE BOTH THE DIFFICULTIES AND THE POSSIBILITIES AS FAIRLY AS I CAN.

MR. PETER EMERY (HONITON): I THANK THE RIGHT HON GENTLEMAN FOR GIVING WAY. I ALSO THANK HIM FOR HIS COMPREHENSIVE STATEMENT. HOWEVER, THERE IS ONE SECTION CONCERNING RELIEF WITH WHICH HE HAS NOT DEALT, NAMELY, THE MUCH MORE DIFFICULT POSSIBILITY OF NIGHT FLYING RELIEF IN. THE RIGHT HON GENTLEMAN HAS NOT MENTIONED THIS. WILL HE DO SO ?

MR. STEWART: THERE IS SOME NIGHT FLYING GOING ON NOW, BUT, FRANKLY THIS IS DESPERATELY INADEQUATE TO MEET THE NEED. TO RELIEVE THE FAMINE WE MUST AT THE VERY LEAST HAVE DAYLIGHT FLIGHTS, INDEED, ONLY A LAND CORRIDOR WILL REALLY MEET THE NEED.

MR. EDWARD HEATH (BEXLEY): THE FOREIGN SECRETARY HAS BEEN VERY PATIENT AND COMPREHENSIVE IN HIS COVERAGE. COULD HE CLARIFY TWO FURTHER POINTS ABOUT DAYLIGHT FLIGHTS FOR RELIEF ? FIRST IS IT THE CASE THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT THAT FLIGHTS SHOULD TAKE PLACE FROM ANY AIRPORT ? SECONDLY, CAN HE SAY WHETHER COLONEL OJUKWU OBJECTS TO FLIGHTS DURING DAYLIGHT COMING FROM ANY AIRPORT, OR WILL HE CONSIDER CERTAIN PLACES FROM WHICH THEY COULD COME PROVIDED THEY DID NOT COME FROM FEDERAL TERRITORY.?

MR. STEWART: I HESITATE TO GIVE A PRECISE ANSWER, SO I WILL ASK MY RIGHT HON FRIEND TO DEAL WITH THAT POINT IN REPLY.

ONE OF THE DIFFICULTIES IS THAT COL OJUKWU FEELS THAT IF FOOD CAME IN BY DAY IT COULD THEN BE PRESUMED THAT ALL-NIGHT FLIGHTS WERE BRINGING IN ARMS AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT COULD LEGITIMATELY TRY TO SHOOT DOWN NIGHT FLIGHTS. THAT WOULD NOT BE WELCOME TO COL OJUKWU, AND FOR THAT REASON HE IS NOT PREPARED AT PRESENT TO GIVE HIS CONSENT TO DAYLIGHT FLIGHTS. MY RECOLLECTION - I SHALL NOT SAY MORE THAN THIS - IS THAT THE CONSENT OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WOULD APPLY TO ANY AIRPORT. IF I AM WRONG ABOUT THAT, MY RIGHT HON FRIEND WILL PUT THE RECORD STRAIGHT BEFORE THE END OF THE DAY

.....

ENDS VERBATIM SERVICE VS 319/68.....LPS

CENTROFORM LBN

SENT VOO

ENDS

SENT AT 1103A

PLS ACK.

SMG

246-252

1p + 7 sub'ded pl fi...

18/12/68
ch

19/12

Bu. (p. 245) on 22/1/69.
to the SAS(G).

19/12/68
ch

sp/s. 359
c/o University of Ibadan,
Ibadan.
2nd January, 1969.

The Secretary to the Military Government
and Head of Service,
Western State,
Ibadan.

SAS (G)
I have discussed
with Col. Obasanjo
CP. Pls. file away.
Mass Demonstration

Under the auspices of University Staff, Students and Workers in
Ibadan, a manifestation will take place in Ibadan starting at 10 a.m.
on Saturday, 4 January, 1969. 3/1/69

2. The aims of the manifestation are to :-


- (a) protest against the involvement of foreign governments and interests (namely N.A.T.O. Powers (United States of America, Britain, France, Western Germany, Portugal, Belgium, etc.) Israel, CARITAS and International Red Cross) in the Nigerian Civil War as evidenced by the recent decision of the United States of America to supply aircraft carriers to the rebels, the supply of arms to the rebels by France, the questionable role of the CARITAS and the International Red Cross, and the meddlesomeness of Britain;
- (b) signify our support for and total commitments to the objective of ending the rebellion in Nigeria by the Federal Military Government in order to preserve the unity of the country; and
- (c) indicate our preparedness to offer our services to the Federal Military Government in the imminent total mobilisation of the nation.

3. The demonstration is expected to start at 10 a.m. Participants from the University of Ibadan will assemble at the Tower Court, University of Ibadan from where they will proceed to join other participants at the Race Course, Ibadan. At the Race Course, after a brief rally to be addressed by some of the organisers, the demonstration will proceed to deliver letters of protest at the United States Consulate and the British Deputy High Commission. At the end of the demonstration a representative body of the participants will call at the Government House, Ibadan in order to deliver a memorandum to His Excellency, the Military Governor of the Western State for onward transmission to Major-General Gowon, Head of the Federal Military Government.

4. Perhaps I scarcely need to emphasize that the aim of the manifestation is non-political or non-partisan. Efforts have been made to impress these objectives on the organisers and prospective participants through the medium of our publicity materials.
5. Amongst the organisers of this demonstration, apart from the writer of this letter, are :-

Professor O. Aboyade
Professor E.U. Essien-Udom
Professor A. L. Mabogunje
Dr. F. O. Okediji, and
Mr. Ola. Oni, and
Professor E.U. Emovon.

6. In the circumstances, I should be most grateful for the utmost cooperation of the law enforcement agencies in the State during the demonstration.


TAYO AKPATA


For and on Behalf of the Organisers.

Copy to :-

The Commander,
Second Area Command,
Nigerian Army,
Ibadan.


The Commissioner of Police,
The Nigerian Police,
Western State,
Ibadan.

C.R.
7/1 file away.


8/1/69 

Reference your letter SP/S. 359/245 of
19/12/68

With the Compliments of



THE DIRECTOR,
INFORMATION DIVISION,

Federal Ministry of Information, Lagos
Telephone: 21221, Telegram: VERACITY

SAS(G),

Pl see the compl. slip above
under which additional 6 copies
of the "bulletin" referred to at p. 245
were forwarded. The copies are now
in the registry and you may
wish to give directions as to
their distribution pl.

13/1/69
CR

SECRET

Ref. No. SP/S. 359/256
Office of the Military Governor,
Ibadan.

23rd January, 1969

CIRCULAR LETTER

TO: ALL PERMANENT SECRETARIES
AND HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

Cyclostyled pamphlets on the above subject matter were recently received in this Office from the Federal Ministry of Information, with a request that the contents be made available to senior Government Personnel.

2. I am directed to forward herewith a copy of the pamphlet. You are to please note that the circulation is restricted strictly to senior Government personnel in your Ministry/Department.

F. B. A. Conde

(F. B. A. Conde)
for Secretary to the Military Government
and Head of Service

SECRET

P.A.
[Signature]
23/1

despto.
JBA
23/1

SP/S-359-
257

INFORMATION ON SHOPS AND PROPERTIES
ABANDONED BY EASTERN NIGERIANS FORMERLY RESIDENT
IN IBADAN.

1. Number of shops abandoned: 32

2. Number of shops now opened: 20

All the shops under this category were re-opened by the landlords after obtaining Court Orders and where properties were found, such properties were taken over by the Deputy Sheriff of the High Court of Justice. Some of the properties have been sold by the Court Bailiff and money realised therefrom had been paid to the Court for safe keeping. In one or two cases, the properties are still being held by the High Court unsold but arrangement is being made to auction them.

3. Number of shops found empty: 13

4. Number of shops abandoned and on which the landlords are still seeking Court Orders for re-opening: 12

5. Number of shops abandoned and on which no action has been taken by the landlords to seek court-orders for re-opening: -

Note

In one particular case a shop is still locked up because the High Court decided that since the former Eastern Nigerian tenant had paid his rent in advance up to 1972 the shop should not be opened until the expiration of the period covered by the rent.

Sp. 258-261

dad
-30/1

SCHEDULE OF SHOPS FORMERLY HIRED BY TRADERS OF EASTERN NIGERIA ORIGIN

Address of the Shop	Name and Address of Landlord	Name of the former Tenant according to the former list	Name of Present Tenant	Time and Date of the present Tenant	Source of Order for opening the shop	What happened to the property in the shop.
1. 9 Lebanon Street	Mr. N.A. Chaida 9 Lebanon Street	F.F. Mebena all Wool and Fancy Goods	NIL	NIL	Sworn an affidavit at the Magistrate court on 3/8/67	With the court
2. 11 Lebanon Street	Mr. William Coure 11 Lebanon Street	J.D. Jophros All Wool and Fancy Goods	NIL	NIL	Still locked up (Landlord on leave in Lebanon)	-
3. 15 Lebanon Street	Mr. Rufai Salami 58 Lebanon Street	Mr. Okonkwo, U.O.O. All Wool Stores	NIL	NIL	Still locked up on the orders of the Court because rent had been paid up till 1972	-
4. 19 Lebanon Street	Mr. George Nabham 34 Lebanon Street	Mr. James Junson Modesty Stores	Mr. M. Shaim (Rima Fancy Stores) Sublet a part to Mr. K. Olalekan Fancy Goods	1. 11. 68 20. 12. 68	By Court Action	With the Court
5. 21 Lebanon Street	Late Chief S. L. Akintola	Malluo House of Fashion	NIL	NIL	Still locked. Care-taker not available for interview	-
6. 26 Lebanon Street	U.A.C. of Nigeria Ltd P.O. Box 20, Ibadan	Mr. Okonkwo, U.O.O. Trading (Cotton) Stores	NIL	NIL	Still locked. Landlord not available for interview.	-
7. 34 Lebanon Street	Mr. H. Nabham, 34-38 Lebanon Street	Famous Malluo House of Fashion	I. Mudah 34 Lebanon Road	1. 11. 68	Occupied by Court action	With the court.

Address of the Shop.	Name and Address of Landlord	Name of the former Tenant according to the former list	Name of Present Tenant	Time and Date of the present Tenant	Source of Order for opening the shop	What happened to the property in the shop.
8. 49/1 Lebanon Street	Mr. Chyban Gamra 49 Lebanon Street	De Honesty All Wool & Fancy Stores (Mr. Matthews Okeke)	Ojofeyitimi Enterprise Ebony Store	Apr. 1 1968	Court Orders	Taken over by the High Court Ibadan.
49/1 Lebanon Street	- do -	De Prince of Social All Wool & Fancy Stores (Mr. Marthos Iomew Anikebe)	Mr. Jowole Omele Fancy Stores	25. 4. 68	Court Orders	- do -
9. 56 Lebanon Street	Mr. Paul Coura 11, Lebanon Street	De Modern All Wool & Cotton Materials	Madam Sabainai Akinkugbe Stores	-	Court Orders	- do -
10. 68 Lebanon Street	Mr. Joseph Karkar 78B Lebanon Street	Prince & Nnem All Wool & Fancy Stores (Mr. O. O. Nnem Umeike)	Mr. Yemi Opadokun	20. 2. 68	Sworn an affidavit at the High Court of Justice W/N on 7/2/68	Nothing found.
11. 74 Lebanon Street	Mr. Abraham Younam P.O.Box 177, Ibadan	Dimasa All Wool & Fancy Stores	Mr. Isaac Ajayi Kanisuru Fancy Stores	2. 2. 68	Court Orders	Taken over by the High court
12. 3 Lebanon Cross Road	Mr. Abraham Younam P.O.Box 177, Ibadan	De Seadon Modern Stores	New sign on the wall "F.H. Mudah & Co. Ltd.	-	Still locked. Landlord not available for interview	-
13. 17/1 New Court Road	Mr. Moukarim P.O.Box 54, Kaduna	J. Modern All Wool & Fancy Stores	Jummy Stores	Dec. 67	Sworn declaration in the High Court by the (caretaker)	Landlord not available for interview.
14. 17/2 New Court Road	- do -	J. D. Jephros	Mr. E. A. Oni Radio Shop	Nov. 68	- do -	- do -
15. 17/3 New Court Road	- do -	No Signboard	- do -	Dec. 67	- do -	- do -
16. 17/4 New Court	- do -	- do -	Samson Quality Fashion Stores 2. Ajike Ladies Stores	Feb. 68 -	- do - - do -	- do - - do -

Address of the Shop	Name and Address of Landlord	Name of the former Tenant according to the former list	Name of Present Tenant	Time and Date of the Present Tenant	Source of order for opening the shop	What happened to the Property in the shop.
17. 19 New Court Road	The Manager Co-operative Market Stores P.O.Box 16, Ibadan.	Messrs. Herbert Egwu-gu James Okonkwo, Jeremiah Ume (De Model & Fancy Fashion Shop.	None Yet. Renovation was being carried out	-	Court Orders	Nothing found
18. 9 Lebanon Cross Road	Mr. Abraham Younan B. & Y. Pools P.O.Box 177, Ibadan.	Mr. Nwaka Crossway Stores All Fancy and Hardwares	-	-	Still Closed. Action is being taken in the High Court to open the shop.	-
19. 147 ¹ New Court Road	Chief A.O. Mekanjuola NW4/60 Ekotedo Ibadan	Mr. J.D. Jephros All Wool Fancy Stores	Olaiya Trading Stores	Jan. 1968	Sworn declaration in the High Court	Nothing found.
20. 147 ² New Court Road	- do -	Mr. Okonkwo All Wool Fancy Stores	Mr. Dosunmu	Jan. 1968	- do -	Nothing found.
21. SW6/55 Lebanon	- do -	Mr. Clement Awuamuna	Mr. Ayodele	-	- do -	- do -
22. 2 Lebanon Cross Road	Mr. A.G. Tayah, c/o Bank of the North, P.O.Box 1375, Ibadan	Standard City Chemist Messrs. Obi & Igwe	-	-	Still closed. Action is being taken in the High Court	- do -
23. Shop No. 12 at 63 Lebanon/Onireke Str. Ibadan	Mr. Paul Coure 11 Lebanon Street, Ibadan.	Mr. Nwakaibe	-	-	Still closed Action is being taken in the High Court	- do -
24. 15 Mudah's Corner	Mr. I. Mudah, 45, Lebanon St. Ibadan	Mr. Anthony Gab. Olugburu	Messrs. M.S. Adeosun	April 1968	Sworn declaration at Magistrate court Ibadan	Nothing found.
25. 28-29 Mudah's Corner	- do -	Mr. Vincent Anowai	Mrs. Sariy7 Oladapo sublet a part to Mrs. B. Lufadeju	October 1968 - do -	- do - - do -	Nothing found
26. NW4/51C Onireke	Late Chief S. L. Akintola	Mr. Joseph	-	-	Still closed. Action in progress in the High Court.	- do -

	Address of the Shop	Name and Address of Landlord	Name of the former Tenant according to the former list	Name of present Tenant	Time and Date of the Present Tenant	Source of order for opening the shop	What happened to the property in the shop.
27	NW4/51C Onireke	Late Chief S.L. Akintola	Mr. Emmanuel	-	-	Still closed. Action in progress in the High Court	-
28.	51 Onireke Street	Mr. A. O. Coker	Bojina All Wool & Fancy Store	Mrs. Sifawu Kuku	June 1968	Sworn Declaration in the High Court	Nothing Found.
29.	50/1 Onireke Str. (Temporary Wooden Shop)	Mr. Latifu Musa NW4/28 Oke Padre Ibadan	No signboard	Mr. Bili Aja Mr. Kasali Agboola	13. 1. 69	Sworn Declaration in the High Court	Nothing found.
30	50/2 Onireke Str. (Temporary Wooden Shop)	Mrs. R. A. Shokeye S7/535, Molete Ibadan	Mr. Yellow	Mr. Olu Awodiya	April 1, 1968	Occupied	Nothing found.
31.	50/3 Onireke Str. (Temporary Wooden Shop)	Mr. Nofiu Tijani NW4/18 Salvation Army Road, Oke- Padre, Ibadan	Mr. C. O. Nsewi	-	-	-	-
32.	50/4 Onireke Str. (Temporary Wooden Shop)	- do -	Mr. Paul Nyebike	-	-	-	-

POSTS AND TELEGRAPHS NIGERIA
PRIVATE INLAND TELEGRAM FORM

263

804
A

OFFICE OF THE MILITARY GOVERNOR
RECEIVED
21 JAN 1969
11.45 am
WESTERN NIGERIA IBADAN

Message						
Reply						
Porterage						
Other Charges						
Total						

Prefix: Office of Origin and Service Instructions: Words Chargeable: Date: Time: At:

8? 0187 C 210 LG TAPE 1/641 LAGOS 33 20 243 =

Date Stamp: Actual: By:

To: SEC MIL GOV IBADAN =

OBSERVER TEAM OF NINE ARRIVE IBADAN 28 TH INSTANT
BY PLANE 1600 X MEETING MIL GOV 29 TH
WISHING TO EXAMINE RECORDS OF ABANDONED IBO PROPERTY
GRATEFUL ARRANGE ACCOMMODATION AND RECEPTION X
LETTER FOLLOWS X = Perm dxf

name and address of sender to be entered on back (Not to be telegraphed)

DPL FWO 1221

SAS(G),

Above is sub'd fl.

21/1/69
CR.

Y.E.

Pls. see above. The U.N. observers will arrive in Ibadan on 28 Jan. and meet Y.E. on 29 Jan. I suggest 12.30 pm. for the meeting which shd. be followed by an informal lunch to which a few State Commissioners and officials may be invited.

2. As regards accommodation, I suggest the observers be accommodated

2 264
at the Premier's Hotel at
Fed. Government's expense.

3. With regard to the desire
of the observers to examine
records of abandoned the
property, they will learn when
they arrive that no such
records exist since no one
has had to abandon his
property in the West which is today
the safest place for any
one to live in the whole

Federation including Greenland.
The only exception is the shops re-opened
at Abegji, Greenland, is well documented.

~~Adm 1~~
Smt 23/1/69

Agreed. Please invite few Commissioners
and officials.

27/1

Pro Sec and Adcs to note

Noted.

Pro Sec
Adm. Sec.

27/1

265/3
28AL
SP/S. 359/T.

28AL
January, 1969.

The General Manager,
Premier Hotel,
Ibadan.

Booking of Accommodation for
Members of the Observer Team.

I am directed to refer to telephone discussion between Mr. Ariyo and the undersigned yesterday, Monday, 27th January, 1969 and to confirm that accommodation should be reserved for 9 members of the Foreign Observer Team for tonight Tuesday, 28th January, 1969.

2. The bill should be forwarded to this Office for transmission to the Federal Military Government, Lagos.



(E.S. Sorinmade),
for Secretary to the Military
Government.

See H
P. 275

Telephone : 21666

Telegrams : PERMDEF

SECRET



No. Jc/51 Sec/T/6

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

PRIVATE MAIL BAG 12590,

LAGOS, NIGERIA

21st January, 1969.

The Secretary to the Military Governor,
Office of the Military Governor,
IBADAN.

Proposed Visit to Ibadan of the
International Observer Team To Nigeria:
28th - 29th January, 1969

P. 263
I am directed to refer to my telegram No. Jc/51 Sec/T/4 of 20th January, 1969, and to confirm that the International Observer Team comprising nine members will leave Lagos by air at 1400 on 28th January, 1969, and arrive at Ibadan at 1600. They are expected back in Lagos at 1400 on 29th January, 1969.

2. While in Ibadan, the Team wishes to meet His Excellency the Military Governor of Western State on 29th January, 1969, and to see and examine records of abandoned Ibo property, if any.

3. I should be grateful if you would arrange accommodation, reception and transport facilities.

Popo
(B. G. Popo)
for Permanent Secretary.

SECRET

2675

Programme for the visit to the Western State
by Members of the International Observer Team
28th - 29th January, 1969.

TUESDAY, 28TH JANUARY, 1969 :

4.00 p.m. Arrive Ibadan by road.
Night at Premier Hotel.

WEDNESDAY, 29TH JANUARY, 1969 :

9.00 a.m. Leave Premier Hotel for University of Ibadan
9.10 a.m. Meet the Registrar, University of Ibadan
9.40 a.m. Leave University of Ibadan for University
of Ife (Ibadan Campus)
9.45 a.m. Meet Dean of Faculty of Science, University
of Ife (Ibadan Campus)
10.10 a.m. Leave University of Ife (Ibadan Campus)
for Ibadan Garrison Organisation Head-
quarters.
10.25 a.m. Meet Commander, Ibadan Garrison Organisation.
10.55 a.m. Leave Ibadan Garrison Organisation
Headquarters for Ministry of Trade and
Industry.
11.⁰⁰~~55~~ a.m. Meet Permanent Secretary, Ministry of
Trade and Industry. To be conducted on a
tour of Ibo shops in Ibadan
1.00 p.m. Courtesy call on His Excellency the
Military Governor at ExCo Chambers
1.30 p.m. Lunch with His Excellency the Military
Governor at Government House
3.00 p.m. Depart for Lagos by road.

International

List of Invitees to the Informal Luncheon
in honour of 9 Members of the Foreign Observer Team
on Wednesday, 29th January, 1969
at 1.15 p.m. for 1.30 p.m.

1. Alhaji D. S. Adegbenro, Ministry of Finance, Ibadan
2. Chief Bisi Onabanjo, Ministry of Health, Ibadan
3. Chief Kola Balogun, Min. of Economic Planning & Social Dev.
4. Mr. Adeoye Adisa, Ministry of Home Affairs & Information
5. Professor F. O. Mosekun, Ministry of Trade & Industry
6. Mr. Bola Ige, Ministry of Agric. & Nat. Resources.
7. Chief B. A. Ajayi, Min. of Local Govt. & Chieftaincy Affairs.
8. Lt.-Col. Olu Bajowa, Ibadan Garrison Organisation, N.A., Ibadan
9. Mr. E. O. Olufunwa, Western State Police Headquarters, Ibadan
10. Mr. P. T. Odumosu, Office of the Military Governor, Ibadan
11. Dr. F. A. Ajayi, Ministry of Justice, Ibadan
12. Chief N. O. A. Akinyemi, Office of the Military Governor
13. Mrs. F. M. Akintunde-Ighodalo, Ministry of Trade & Industry

⑩ 14-17

Observers

- | | |
|-------------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1. Brigadier Sir B. Fergusson | (British) |
| 2. General A. Raab | (Swede) |
| 3. Col. A. Alkewich | (Polish) |
| 4. Captain Yylma | (Ethiopia) |
| 5. Lt. M. Biecey | (Polish) |
| 6. Mr. Cussing | (UNO) |
| 7. Mr. R. Omar | (OAU) |
| 8. Lt.-Col. Cairns | (British) |
| 9. Major Tamm | (Swiss) |
| 10. Lt.-Col. Stile Apollo | (Min. of Defence, Lagos) |
| 11. Mr. E. Persidis | (" " ") |

- ⑩ 14. Lt.-Col. S. K. Omojokun, Camp Commandant, I.G.O.
15. " " T. Oyeleke, I.G.O Headquarters
16. Mr. E. L. Omitola, Nigeria Police Headquarters
17. " S. A. Oshodi " " "



From:

The Military Governor
Ibadan

Lunch Today

....., 19.....

1. Bayowa
2. Onojokun
3. Oyedele

Mr Olupunwa
Onitola
Oshodi

ARCHIVES

PLEASE BRING THIS CARD



2707

His Excellency, Brigadier R. A. Adebayo, idc, psc,
Military Governor, Western State
requests the pleasure of the company of

AT A LUNCH

in honour of Members of the International Observer Team in Nigeria

at Government House, Agodi, Ibadan

on Wednesday, 29th January, 1969.

DRESS Informal

TIME 1.15 P.M. FOR 1.30 P.M.

R SVP
Ceremonials Officer
Office of the Military Governor, Ibadan
Telephone: Ibadan 24052

271/8
SP/S.359/T.

28th January, 1969.

The Commander,
Ibadan Garrison Organisation,
Nigerian Army,
Ibadan.

Visit of 9 Members of
International Observer Team.

4267
I am directed to refer to telephone discussion between Major Obeya and the undersigned this afternoon, Tuesday, 28th January, 1969 and to forward herewith for necessary action, two copies of the programme for the visit to the Western State by 9 Members of the International Observer Team.

2. As shown on the programme, the Observers are expected to be in your Office from 10.25 a.m. to 10.55 a.m. tomorrow morning - Wednesday, 29th January, 1969.



(E.S. Sorinmade),
for Secretary to the Military
Government.

9 272
SP/S.359/T.

28th January, 1969.

The Permanent Secretary,
Ministry of Trade and Industry,
Ibadan.

Visit of 9 Members of
International Observer Team.

P 267
I am directed to refer to telephone discussion between Mr. J.O. Taiwo and the undersigned this afternoon, Tuesday, 28th January, 1969 and to forward herewith for necessary action, two copies of the programme for the visit to the Western State by 9 Members of the International Observer Team.

2. As shown on the programme, the Observers are expected to be with you from 11 a.m. to about 1.00 p.m. tomorrow - Wednesday, 29th January, 1969.



(E.S. Sorinmade),
for Secretary to the Military
Government.

SP/S.359/T.

273/10
28th January, 1969.

The Registrar,
University of Ibadan,
Ibadan.

Visit of 9 Members of
International Observer Team.

P 267
I am directed to refer to telephone discussion between the Registrar and the undersigned this afternoon, Tuesday, 28th January, 1969 and to forward herewith for necessary action, two copies of the programme for the visit to the Western State by 9 Members of the International Observer Team.

2. As shown on the programme, the Observers are expected to be in your University from 9.10 a.m. to 9.40 a.m. tomorrow morning - Wednesday, 29th January, 1969.

(E.S. Sorinmade),
for Secretary to the Military
Government.



SP/S.359/T.

27411
28th January, 1969.

The Assistant Registrar,
University of Ife,
(Ibadan Campus),
Ibadan.

Visit of 9 Members of
International Observer Team.

P-267
I am directed to refer to telephone discussion between the Assistant Registrar and the undersigned this afternoon, Tuesday, 28th January, 1969 and to forward herewith for necessary action, two copies of the programme for the visit to the Western State by 9 Members of the International Observer Team.

2. As shown on the programme, the Observers are expected to be in your University from 9.45 a.m. to 10.10 a.m. tomorrow morning - Wednesday, 29th January, 1969.



(E.S. Sorinmade),
for Secretary to the Military
Government.

SP/S.359/T.

275
17
29th January, 1969.

The General Manager,
Premier Hotel,
Ibadan.

Booking of Accommodation for
Members of the Observer Team.

P. 265
17
I am directed to refer to my letter No. SP/S.359/T of 28th January, 1969 and subsequent telephone discussion between Mrs. Kuku and the undersigned and to confirm that accommodation should be reserved for 11 members of the International Observer Team and not 9 members as stated in the letter under reference which is hereby cancelled.

2. The bill should be forwarded direct to the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Accounting Division, Lagos, for settlement.



(E.S. Sorinmade),
for Secretary to the Military
Government.

276 ¹³

PARTICULARS OF ACTION TAKEN ON THE ARTICLES FOUND IN
PREMISES FORMERLY OCCUPIED BY TRADERS OF EASTERN NIGERIA ORIGIN.

ISSUED BY THE MINISTRY OF TRADE & INDUSTRY

Address of Shop	Name of the Tenant	Date when Court Orders was obtained	Value of Property found at the pre-mises when opened	Where Property was found and sold; what happened to the amount realised.
11. Lebanon Street	J. O. Jephros	High Court order No. 1/25/68 of 7/5/68.	£25. 4. 9d.	Paid to the High Court Ibadan.
17/19 Lebanon Street	James Jumson	Magistrate Court order No. MI/128/68 High Court order No. 1/13/68 of 16/9/68	House: £101. 7. 5d. Shop: £25. 14/=	"
26 Lebanon Street	U. O. O. Trading Cotton Stores	Magistrate Court order No. cm/61/68 of 5/10/68	Shop: £536. 3. 9d.	Paid into Chief Magistrate Court, Ibadan.
56 Lebanon Street	H. B. Eguagy (De Mordern All Wool and Cotton Materials)	High Court order No. 1/24/68 of 7/5/68	Shop: £14. 13. 7d.	Paid to High Court Ibadan.
34 Lebanon Street	Louis Ibe (Famous Malluo House of Fashion)	High Court order No. 1/12/68	Not yet sold	Properties still being held by the Deputy Sheriff, High Court Ibadan.

277 ~~14~~

INVENTORY OF PROPERTIES FOUND IN

MODESTY STORES (Owned by Jones Jemson & Others)

17/19 Lebanon Street,

Ibadan.

- | | | |
|-----|----|----------------------------------|
| 1. | 59 | Playing records assorted |
| 2. | 1 | Dinning Table |
| 3. | 1 | Wall mirror |
| 4. | 2 | Standing glass (one broken) |
| 5. | 1 | Show case (wooden & glass) |
| 6. | 2 | Iron beds 3' x 6' |
| 7. | 1 | Draft game |
| 8. | 10 | wooden chairs with iron |
| 9. | 1 | Standing Electric Fan |
| 10. | 1 | Small Bench |
| 11. | 1 | Grundig Radiogram |
| 12. | 1 | Tin cutter |
| 13. | 14 | Buckets |
| 14. | 1 | Small Enamel cup |
| 15. | 2 | Enamel Trays |
| 16. | 2 | Enamel Big Basins |
| 17. | 3 | Small Enamels Basins |
| 18. | 1 | Basin cover |
| 19. | 1 | Ludo Game |
| 20. | 23 | Window Blinds |
| 21. | 1 | Electric Kettle |
| 22. | 29 | Assorted big gramophone records. |
| 23. | 11 | Wool Pillows |
| 24. | 2 | Cutlasses |
| 25. | 2 | Pillows |
| 26. | 1 | Black old dirty overcoat |
| 27. | 1 | Dirty small towels |
| 28. | 26 | Cushions |
| 29. | 5 | Square wooden tables |
| 30. | 2 | Wool Mattresses |
| 31. | 11 | Wooden cushions chairs |
| 32. | 1 | Couch Chair |
| 33. | 1 | Broad stand wooden |
| 34. | 5 | Small wooden stools |
| 35. | 17 | Assorted cups |
| 36. | 26 | Assorted plates (Breakable) |
| 37. | 1 | Breakable basin |
| 38. | 1 | Small bottle for sugar. |

NOTE:-

Items mentioned above were removed to the Deputy Sherrifs Office, High Court, Ibadan on the order of the High Court.

INVENTORY OF PROPERTIES FOUND IN
FAMOUS MALLUO HOUSE OF FASHION (Owned by Louis Ibe)

1. 40 Pieces of cloth of different kinds
2. 40 pieces of cloth of different kinds
3. 40 pieces of cloth of different kinds
4. 40 pieces of cloth of different kinds
5. 40 pieces of cloths of different kinds
6. 40 Pieces of cloth of different kinds
7. 40 Pieces of cloth of different kinds
8. 40 Pieces of cloth of different kinds
9. 40 Pieces of cloth of different kinds
10. 40 Pieces of cloth of different kinds
11. 40 Pieces of cloth of different kinds
12. 40 Pieces of cloth of different kinds
13. 20 Pieces of cloth of different kinds
14. 6 Pieces of cloth of different kinds
15. 40 Pieces of cloth of different kinds
16. 20 Pieces of cloth of different kinds
17. 20 Pieces of Cloth of different kinds
18. 20 Pieces of cloth of different kinds
19. 20 Pieces of cloth of different Kinds
20. 6 Pieces of cloth of different kinds
21. 20 Pieces of cloth of different kinds
22. 40 Pieces of cloth of different kinds.
23. 11 Pieces of cloth of different kinds
24. 20 Pieces of cloth of different kinds
25. 40 Pieces of cloth of different kinds
26. 20 Pieces of cloth of different kinds.
27. 40 Pieces of cloth of different kinds.

NOTE :3

Items mentioned above were removed to the Deputy Sherrifs
Office, High Court, Ibadan on the Order of the High Court.

INVENTORY OF PROPERTIES FOUND IN

U. O. TRADING STORES (Owned by Okeke,
O. E. Ozoemera and Nwokedi Okafor)
26, Lebanon Street,
Ibadan.

1. 209 Cotton materials rolls
2. 14 Assorted colour shirts (dressing)
3. 46 Assorted Singlets shirts women and men
4. 19 Assorted trousers
5. 59 Assorted sweaters Men and Women
6. 40 Assorted Ladies Blouses
7. 13 Assorted ties
8. 23 Assorted woolen jackets
9. 75 Ordinary wooden hangers.
10. 25 Display iron hangers
11. 2 Bundles and pieces
12. 2 Pairs of scissors
13. 3 Pieces of clothes
14. 1 Old Umbrella
15. 36 Assorted rolls of lace clothes
16. 50 Dressing materials rolls
17. 10 Steel iron hangers
18. 3 Display wooden stools
19. 2 Ceiling fan (not removed)
20. 2 Chairs
21. 1 Writing table with draws
22. 1 Native water cooler
23. 15 Fluorescent (not removed)
24. 1 Mirror broken
25. Display Counter (not removed)
26. 186 Receipts Books, (45 new , 141 used)
27. 6 Rolls of floor ruddges

NOTE :

Items mentioned above were removed to the
Deputy Sherrifs Office, High Court, Ibadan
on the order of the High Court.

Inventory of Articles found in the shop occupied
by Mr. O. O. Nnem Umeike 'M' at No. 68 Lebanon
Street, Ibadan.

Two Ceiling Fans
8 Florescent Lights
One Scissors
One Recknor
Two Daily Sales Books
Two Empty desks
Three Stools
One Jug
4 Empty Paint Tins
1 Cup
1 Tumbler
2 Padlocks
8 Receipt Books
2 Files with some receipts
1 Rediffusion Loud Speaker
3 keys.

N.B. Items mentioned above are in custody of the
Nigeria Police.

28/18

Inventory of Articles found in F.F. Mebena
All Wool & Fancy Goods at No. 9 Lebanon
Street, Ibadan

- 77 Woollen Standing
- 1 Ceiling Fan
- 9 Four feet flourescent lights
- 1 Umbrella
- 1 Two feet flourescent light
- 1 Mirror
- 1 Table with some papers inside.
- 1 Carpet spread on the floor
- 1 Sleeping mat
- 22 Iron Hangers
- 3 Wooden Hangers
- 1 Cow Tail Wipe.

N.B. Items mentioned above are in custody of the
Nigeria Police.

INVENTORY OF PROPERTIES FOUND IN

DE MODERN ALL WOOL AND COTTON MATERIALS

(Owned by H. B. E. EGUWAGU)

56, Lebanon Street,

Ibadan.

1. 5 Fluorescent Light Engines.
2. 1 Ceiling fan.
3. 8 Hangers
4. 2 Pairs of scissors
5. 1 Standing Mirror
6. Ritraps (Planks)
7. 1 Measurement Tape.
8. 1 flour rug

NOTE :

Items mentioned above were removed to the Deputy Sherrifs Office, High Court, Ibadan on the order of the High Court.

283 20

S.E.O. (P)..

The Manager of the Rem Hotel, Mokola gave the bill for £12: 14: 6d. at back cover to me this morning and requested that this Office would settle the bills.

2. I only knew about the occupation of the Rem Hotel by the drivers of the Ministry of Defence who came with the Members of the International Observer Team when we were about to leave the Ibo Stores at Mokola yesterday, (29/1/69). It was at that time that Lt.-Col. Apolo informed me that the hotel bills incurred by these drivers be forwarded to the Ministry of Defence, in Lagos for settlement.


3. I also raised the question of settlement of the bill with Mr. Persidis of the Ministry of Defence in your presence at Government House and he confirmed that the bill be forwarded to Federal Ministry of Defence in Lagos. You may therefore wish to forward the bill to Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Lagos for early settlement.

~~on 27/8~~
(O.A. Egbeyemi),

E.O. (Protocol),

20/1/69.

(P)
Thank you. I fwd the bill to Min^y of Defence and refer to your discussions with Lt. Col Apolo and Mr. Persidis. You shd add that the Manager of the Hotel and he grateful for immediate settlement of the bill.


20/1/69

21 284
SP/S. 359/T.

20 January, 1969.

The Permanent Secretary,
Ministry of Defence,
P.M.B. 12,590,
Lagos.

Settlement of Rem Hotel Bills.

I am directed to refer to conversation which the undersigned had with Lt.-Col. S. Apollo and Mr. E. Persidis of your Ministry on Wednesday, 29th January, 1969 over the settlement of the hotel accommodation bills incurred by the drivers of your Ministry during the two days visit to Ibadan of nine member International Observer Team, and to forward herewith bill No. RHI.624 of 29th January, 1969 with its relevant attachments for early settlement.

2. The Manager of the hotel brought the bills personally to this office and expressed that he would be most grateful if immediate settlement is effected.

Issue
21/1/69
See 286
S.E.O. (P)
The above issued to directors - 7
minute at the foot of 5th Feb 1969.
21/1/69
21/1
(O.A. Egbeyemi),
for Permanent Secretary,
(Political & Administration).



PREMIER HOTEL

IBADAN NIGERIA

GM.1/Vol.7/312

P. O. BOX 1206

TEL: 23041-50

CABLES: PREMOTEL

31st January, 1969

The Secretary to the Military Government,
Office of the Military Governor,
Ibadan.

For the attention of Mr. E.S. Sorinmade

a.b.c.
at bc Dear Sir,

We have pleasure in enclosing our bill Nos
0265, 0276 and 0280

P275 for the amount of £73 14s 0d in respect of
expenses incurred by Members of the Observer Team. Your letter
SP/S.359/T of 29th January, 1969 refers please.

We would be grateful for early settlement of the bill while
thanking you for your continued patronage.

Assuring you of our constant attention and courtesy at all
times.

Yours faithfully,

(A. ARIYO)

Ag. General Manager

See 23
sup 286



SP/S.359/T.

February, 1969.

The Permanent Secretary,
Ministry of Defence,
Accounting Division,
P.M.B. 12,590,
Lagos.

Settlement of Hotel Bills in respect of
Members of the International Observer Team

Further to my letter No. SP/S.359/T of 30th
January, 1969 and discussion between Mr. E. Peroidis and
the undersigned, I forward herewith copy of Premier Hotel
letter No. GM.1/Vol.7/312 of 31st January, 1969 together
with the bills in respect of members of the International
Observer Team, Lt.-Col. Sule Apollo and Mr. E. Peroidis.

2. Early settlement of the bills direct with the
Premier Hotel to which a copy of this letter is being sent
will be much appreciated.

(E.S. ~~Sorinmade~~),
for Permanent Secretary,
(Political & Administration).

Ref. No. SP/S.359/T/A.
Ibadan, 4th February, 1969.

Copy to :-

The General Manager,
Premier Hotel,
Ibadan.

Above for information with reference to my letter
No. SP/S.359/T of 29th January, 1969.



(E.S. ~~Sorinmade~~),
for Permanent Secretary,
(Political & Administration).

CR.
All merge this file
with the main file.
4/2/69

P.S. (P & A),

On Friday 7th February, 1969, just before the close of office, His Excellency came ^{to} ~~into~~ my office and directed that I should represent him at the funeral of the late Mr. F. Akinniran Olunloye, uncle of the Commissioner for Education, and that Mr. E. S. Serinmade should represent him at the funeral of your late sister, both scheduled for Saturday 8th February, 1969. I carried out the assignment as directed and Mr. Serinmade has reported that he did the same.

2. After the interment of the remains of Mr. Olunloye, the Vicar of St. David's Church, Ibadan (where the funeral service was held), Rev. Canon Falode, who, according to him, is the Chairman of Prisons Visiting Committee, Ibadan, told me that he considered it necessary (for reasons undisclosed to me) that four rebel soldiers at present held in detention at the Agedi Prisons should be removed to another prison. He added that he would like the matter to be brought to the notice of His Excellency.

3. 'Prisons' being a Federal subject, I propose that Canon Falode's message be transmitted to the Assistant Director of Prisons, Western State, with a request for any action he considers necessary and also a suggestion that he might wish to contact the ^{revd.} ~~revd.~~ gentleman for details.

4. You may also consider it advisable to let H.E. know about this, particularly as the prisoners involved are rebel soldiers.

(S. A. Adisa)
Ag. U.S.
11/2/69.

U.S.,

I should like to discuss with Revd. Canon Falode before putting forward his request. Would you please discuss,

on 11/2/69.

P.S.

Ref. above, Rev. Canon Falode is on telephone No. 24649. You may wish to discuss with him.

14/2/69.

U.S.

I would see Rev Falode at
9.30 am on Thursday 20th Feb, 1969
2. He arrange to be present.

on
18/2/69

C.R.

Pls by. 8am on 20/2/69.

S. Adz. Adisa

18/2/69

18/2

U.S.

9 resubmit pl.

ad
C.R. 20/2

P.S. (P&A)

File submitted pls, ref. your minute at the
top of this page.

18/2/69
20/2/69

Note

Interviewed Revd. Falode. He told me that
he did not think it wise to keep rebels soldiers
together with other Ibo's detained for other causes
since the rebels could influence the other Ibo's
into revolting against the authorities in this State.

2 The Committee's findings of which he
is Chairman, have been recorded in a
report submitted to the Ministry of Home Affairs
and Information. I told him I would find out
more about this case from the Supg. Bisoro,
Ladani and if necessary, I would get in
touch with the Army Authorities after
reporting the matter to His Excellency, the
Military Governor.

3. Efforts made to get through to the
Military Governor were not
successful. 20/2/69 Conf. Sec. 21/2/69

CONFIDENTIAL

TELEGRAMS: PERMIND

TELEPHONE NOS.: IBADAN 21011/471
DIRECT LINE: 24111



MINISTRY OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY


IBADAN · WESTERN STATE OF NIGERIA

Your Ref. No.....
All communications to be addressed
to the Permanent Secretary quoting
Our Ref. No. TIB/1297/108.

SA/S. 359

Date 18th February, 1969.

The Secretary to the Military
Government and Head of Service,
Office of the Military Governor,
Ibadan.



Visit of the Team of International
Observers

page 2-6

I forward herewith for the information
of His Excellency, the Military Governor a copy
of the notes of the meeting which my Commissioner
held with the Team of International Observers who
visited this State on 29th January, 1969.

Fela Ighodalo
(Mrs. F. M. Akintunde-Ighodalo),
Permanent Secretary,
Ministry of Trade and Industry.

CONFIDENTIAL

290 290
2

NOTES ON THE MEETING WHICH THE TEAM OF
INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS HELD WITH THE COMMISSIONER FOR
TRADE AND INDUSTRY, WESTERN STATE IBADAN ON
29TH JANUARY, 1969

Present :

Professor F. O. Dosekun	-	Western State Commissioner for Trade and Industry.
Mrs. F. M. Akintunde-Ighodalo	-	Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Trade and Industry.
Colonel Alfrons Olkiewicz	-	Representing Poland: Chairman of the Team of observers.
Baron General-Major Arthur Raab	-	representing Sweden.
Sir Bernard Fergusson	-	representing Britain.
Lt. Col. Cairns	-	representing Britain.
Major Class Tomm	-	representing Sweden
Capt. G. Yilma (from Ethiopia)	-	representing the O. A. U.
Mr. Nils Gussing	-	representing the United Nations.
Mr. Le fgoun Omar	-	representing the O. A. U.
Lt. Michal Bycsy	-	representing Poland.
Colonel Sule Apollo	-	from the Supreme Head Quarters, Lagos.

In Attendance :

Mr. T. A. Taiwo	-	Ag. Chief Trade Officer, Ministry of Trade and Industry.
Mr. B. A. Osokoya	-	Trade Officer, Ministry of Trade and Industry.
Mr. A. Atandeyi	-	Information Officer, Ministry of Trade and Industry.
Mr. S. A. Alade	-	Assistant Trade Officer, Ministry of Trade and Industry.

The Commissioner, Professor F. O. Dosekun, welcomed the team to the Western State on behalf of His Excellency the Military Governor of the Western State, Brigadier R. A. Adebayo. He expressed his deep appreciation for the efforts being made by the team to give a true picture of the situation in the country to the outside world, and indicated his willingness and that of his Permanent Secretary to answer any questions which they might wish to pose.

2. The leader of the team, Colonel Alfons Olkiewicz of Poland explained the purpose of their current tour of the various war fronts and all the States in the Federation, which is to ascertain the true position of things. Their visit

to the Western State, he added, was to find out what had happened to the property left behind by Ibos who had fled this State. In addition they would like to know how many Ibos fled from the State, and how many stayed behind. In reply, the Commissioner said that even long before the crisis, the Government of this State had made clear its policy that the Western State welcomed people from every part of the Federation. The government guaranteed the security of life and property of all in this State irrespective of their ethnic origins and this policy was strictly adhered to even when the Yorubas who are natives of the Western State were forcibly sent out of the Eastern Region in 1966. Therefore, the Commissioner went on, there was no need at all for any one to flee the West. There were no killings of Ibos here in the Western State, except the Ore episode which equally affected both Ibos and Yorubas. Any Ibo who fled the State, the Commissioner went on, did so on his own accord as a result of pressures from the former Eastern Nigeria Government that they should come home. Since they were not driven away, those of them who left had a lot of time to make private arrangements for their property. Some sold theirs, some transferred theirs to friends, while others locked up their property in their respective shops, in the hope that they would soon return.

3. In fact, many had returned and were back again at their professions and trading points. There were only 32 of them who had not returned and their shops were left locked up till the middle of 1968. As their tenancy ran out their landlords wanted to regain possession of their property and so they approached the High Court of Justice which, after due processes of law, ordered the re-opening of the shops and the High Court Bailiffs were sent to take inventory of any property left in the shops. Consequently, the Commissioner added, a full inventory of property left behind in every locked up shops was available. The Commissioner drew the attention of the observers to the case of a shop formerly occupied by an Ibo trader but still locked up on the orders of the High Court because rent had been paid up till 1972. Referring to other parts of the State, the Commissioner said the situation was basically the same. The Ibos were not driven away but left as a result of pressures from home, and many of them had already returned. Concluding his explanation, the Commissioner said that considering the whole population of Ibadan, the fact that only 32 of the shops formerly occupied by Ibo traders were locked showed that the Ibos were not driven

away from Ibadan, but they had a lot of time to make private arrangements for their property.

4. Mr. Nils Gussing, requested to know whether the Ibos were landlords of the shops concerned or whether they were just tenants. The Permanent Secretary then explained that the Commercial Area in question usually referred to as Gbagi had been built by the Syrians, Lebanese and other Landlords and the Ibo traders only came along to hire the shops. There was therefore, no question of an Ibo trader being a Landlord. When the landlords wanted to regain possession and let their shops out again, they applied to the courts for necessary orders. As far as residential houses were concerned, the Ibos made private arrangements and left their houses in the care of some friends because they felt they would soon be back.

5. Then Brigadier Sir. Bernard Fergusson wanted to know the number of Ibos living in the Western State before the crisis. In reply, the Permanent Secretary said that such figures were not available as no registration was undertaken. She then repeated her earlier explanation that the West was and still remains an open society free to all. Owing to the existence of many Federal Institutions like the University of Ibadan, the Cocoa Research Institute of Nigeria, the Federal Department of Agricultural Research etc. in Ibadan, a cosmopolitan society (including Ibo Personnel) existed here. On further question about the number of Ibos who had since returned, the Permanent Secretary replied that an accurate figure could not be given in the absence of any registration.

6. Sir Brigadier Bernard Fergusson then went on to inquire about how the Yorubas who were expelled from the East got to be there. In reply, the Commissioner said that when regionalisation was established in this country, many non-Easterners were absorbed in the Public Service of the then Eastern Region, just as many non-Westerners were also absorbed in the West. The Commissioner then gave the example of an Assistant Chief Clerk in this Ministry a Yoruba, who had worked in the then Eastern Region Public Service for over 35 years but who was repatriated home when the Eastern Nigeria Government requested non-Easterners to leave. He also gave the example of an old man who had spent a number of years in the East and was repatriated at the age of 90. The Commissioner added that apart from the Yorubas working in the then Eastern Region Public Service, many others were also there as traders and private entrepreneurs. On

293 375
8

the question as to how many Yorubas were repatriated, the Permanent Secretary said that they were over 10,000 people.

7. Mr. Nils Gussing then asked whether Ibos were also sent out of the West, when the Yorubas were sent out of the East. The Commissioner in his reply, disclosed that no Ibos were sent out of the West. He said that when the Yoruba repatriates came back to the West, the Government of the Western State had to set-up a Resettlement Committee whose main duty was to help resettle them to the normal social and economic life of the State. In the wake of this rumpus - many demonstrations were organised and much local pressure was put on the Military Governor to send the Ibos away, but the Governor refused such demands and declared that the Western State should not retaliate by driving the Ibos in our midst away. He added that the Western State should be a place for everyone irrespective of ethnic origins. The Commissioner then cited the example of the University of Ibadan where the Military Governor mounted strict security measures for the Ibo population there even though many of these Ibos had been caught with explosives.

8. On Sir Bernard Fergusson's question about how long the Military Governor had been in office, the Commissioner replied that His Excellency Brigadier R. A. Adebayo assumed office as the Military Governor of the Western State in August, 1966. Sir Fergusson then requested to know if there were still any Ibos in the Western State Civil Service and the Permanent Secretary answered in the affirmative, and added that there were a number of them in her Ministry. Continuing, Sir Bernard Fergusson wanted to know if there was any friction between Ibos and non-Ibos in this State. In his reply, the Commissioner said there was nothing like that here because the fighting in the country was not against individuals but against rebellion. Many Ibos were still going about their business unmolested in the State.

9. Captain Yi Lma of Ethiopia (representing the O.A.U.) then requested to know what happened to the movable property in the shops opened by court order. The Commissioner reiterated his earlier explanation that those which could stand storage were in safe custody under the order of the Court, others had been sold by the Court Bailiff and the proceeds left with the courts for safe keeping.

10. The leader of the team, Colonel Olkiewicz then thanked the Commissioner

294 294
6

and the Permanent Secretary for the ready answers they gave to the Team's questions and the lucid explanation given on every subject. He added that all the members of the Team were impressed by the way the discussion went and he was convinced that the spirit of one-Nigeria really existed in the Western State of Nigeria. The meeting was thus brought to an end.

11. The team was then taken on an inspection tour of Ibadan Commercial Area by the Permanent Secretary to see for themselves the position of the property left behind by the Ibos. During the tour, the observers saw at first hand, the shops previously occupied by Ibo traders some still closed, and others already opened with brisk business going on in them. The observers interviewed a number of the present occupants of such shops and their landlords. They also had a chat with two Ibo traders who initially went away to the East but had returned and resumed their normal business without any molestation.

12. At the end of the inspection tour the observers expressed their satisfaction at the arrangement made in safe-guarding the property left behind by the Ibo traders who fled and highly commended the policy of the Government of the State in maintaining both in words and action the spirit of one people and one destiny for all persons of the different ethnic groups which make up Nigeria.

SAS (G)

9 submit from p. + to 6 pl.

CR. 20/2

SAS

4 295

SMG & HS

289-294

Pages ~~4-6~~ are submitted for
information only, please.

2. H.E. may wish to see the pages.

Me
SAS(G)
21/2/69

Y.B.

289-294

p. ~~4-6~~ o. f. i. yes.

John
SME
21/2

23/2

23/2

CR PL pa.

Me
23/2

PS(P & A),

28/2/69
CR

May I resubmit p. 288 pl.

Your Excellency,

Rev. Falode, Chairman of the Prisons Visiting Committee, Ibadan together with the other members of the Committee paid an official visit to the prisons sometime ago. During that visit, they noticed that some Rebel Soldiers were accommodated in the same cell with Ibos who have been detained in the prisons for other causes. The Committee did not think that this was a good thing to do as the rebel soldiers could influence the Ibos to carry out activities which might be perilous to the security of this State. They suggested therefore, that the Prisons Authorities should be advised to keep the rebel soldiers away from the other Ibos in the prisons.

I discussed the matter with the Director of Prisons, Ibadan who agreed that the ideal thing to do is to keep the rebels in separate cells and the other Ibos in other cells but the prisons are more than congested and the best the prisons could do in the circumstances was to keep the rebels together with the other Ibos in the prisons. He assured me however that, as soon as the position with respect to accommodation improves, the rebel soldiers would be separated from the other Ibos.

This being so, there is nothing that can be done now and the present arrangement will have to continue.

The object of this minute is to keep your Excellency informed of the observations made by the Visiting Committee and the result of the action taken on those observations.

N. O. A. Akiyemi
N. O. A. Akiyemi,
Permanent Secretary,
5th March, 1969.

Thank you.
2/3

cf. P.A. 84. 1/3/69

*U.S. To note
and dispose of file
on 6/3/69*



U.S. INFORMATION SERVICE

5915-259
EMBASSY
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA



WHITE HOUSE PRESS RELEASE
February 22, 1969

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT ON THE
NAMING OF A SPECIAL COORDINATOR ON
RELIEF TO THE CIVILIAN VICTIMS OF THE
NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR

I know that I speak for all Americans in expressing this nation's deep anguish for the terrible human suffering in the Nigerian civil war. It is tragic enough to watch a military conflict between peoples who once lived together in peace and developing prosperity. But that tragedy has been compounded, and the conscience of the world engaged by the starvation threatening millions of innocent civilians on both sides of the battle.

Immediately after taking office, I directed an urgent and comprehensive review of the relief situation. The purpose was to examine every possibility to enlarge and expedite the flow of relief. This very complex problem will require continuing study. I am announcing, however, the following initial conclusions of the review:

1. The Red Cross and the Voluntary Agencies are now feeding nearly 1 million people in areas of the war zone controlled by the Federal Military Government of Nigeria. They fully expect the numbers will grow in magnitude over the coming months. This, therefore, will require additional support for the international relief effort from donor countries, and of course the continued cooperation of Federal authorities.

2. There is widely conflicting information on future food requirements within the Biafran-controlled area, where the relief operation is feeding an estimated two million persons. The United States Government therefore is urgently seeking a comprehensive, internationally conducted survey of food needs in that area.

3. Whatever the results of such a survey, it is already clear that the present relief effort is inadequate to the need in the Biafran-controlled area. The major obstacle to expanded relief is neither money, food, nor means of transport. The main problem is the absence of relief arrangements acceptable to the two sides which would overcome the limitations posed by the present hazardous and inadequate nighttime airlift.

4. The efforts of outside governments to expand relief are greatly complicated by the political and military issues that divide the contestants. Unfortunately, the humanitarian urge to feed the starving has become enmeshed in those issues and stands in danger of interpretation by the parties as a form of intervention. But surely it is within the conscience and ability of man to give effect to his humanitarianism without involving himself in the politics of the dispute.

(OVER)

5. It is in this spirit that U.S. policy will draw a sharp distinction between carrying out our moral obligations to respond effectively to humanitarian needs and involving ourselves in the political affairs of others. The U.S. will not shrink from this humanitarian challenge but, in cooperation with those of like mind, will seek to meet it.

With the above conclusions in view, I am pleased to announce that Secretary of State Rogers has today appointed Mr. Clarence Clyde Ferguson, Jr., a distinguished American civic leader and Professor of Law at Rutgers University, as Special Coordinator on relief to civilian victims of the Nigerian civil war. He will be charged with assuring that the U.S. contributions to the international relief effort are responsive to increased needs to the maximum extent possible and that they are effectively utilized. In so doing, He will give particular attention to ways and means by which the flow of relief can be increased to the suffering on both sides of the battle line. He will, of course, work closely with the ICRC and other international relief agencies, the Organization of African Unity, donor governments, and with the parties to the conflict.

The Special Coordinator will not seek and will not accept a charge to negotiate issues other than those directly relevant to relief.

Nevertheless, the U.S. earnestly hopes for an early negotiated end to the conflict and a settlement that will assure the protection and peaceful development of all the people involved.

Nigerian unity?
END
7/3

299
20/3/69

From: Sole Administrator New Bussa
To: Secretary to Mil Gov Ibadan

4 members International
Observer Team arriving
Ibadan about 5 pm 20th
March 1969 from Florin X
Grateful arrange
accommodation for
20th night only X

SMG

Above telegram was dictated to
me from Police Signals Office
at 3.55 pm today.

2. May I have your directive,
please.

[Signature]
SBO(P)
20/3/69

SBO(P)

Pls. arrange. Did we pay
the other time, or the Fed. Govt.
did? However, arrangement
shd. proceed ~~as~~ (20/3)

See pp 22-24

MESSAGE FORM

Police B/1
(Old No. A/52)

DPDL PWO 451

REGISTER SERIAL No.

CALL SIGNS

P3

PRIORITY

04

GROUPS

22

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

MOV

ABOVE THIS LINE FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY

From

SOLE Administrator New Nigeria

Date-Time Origin

20/3/69

(To A)

sechmil.gov. Ibadan.

For Info (W)

Originator's No.

Four members international observer team
arriving Ibadan about 5 PM 20th March 1969
from Ilorin & grateful arrange accommodation
for 20th night only x

Office Date Stamp

(THI. 0800 hr)

T.H.I. or
T.O.R.Time of
ClearanceInitials
Operator's

Signature of Originator

Degree of Priority

11/Immediate

20/4/20

L.H.S./19

M/S read over to Mr. Shorimade, the Protocol
Officer, on phone No. 24052, who promised
of Sending Somebody to come and Collect
the M/S immediately

[Signature] 22/3/69
17927 201545hos

SP/S.359/302.

20th March, 1969.


The General Manager,
Premier Hotel,
Ibadan.

(For attention by Mrs. Kuku).

A c c o m m o d a t i o n .

I hereby confirm the booking made by telephone this afternoon that 4 (four) single rooms should be reserved for four members of the International Observer Team for tonight - 20th March, 1969.

2. Please forward the bills to the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Lagos to whom a copy of this letter is being sent.



(E.S. Akinmade),
for Secretary to the Military
Government.

Ref. No. SP/S.359/302A.

Office of the Military Governor,
Ibadan, 21st March, 1969.

Copy to :-

The Permanent Secretary,
Ministry of Defence,
Lagos.

Above for information and necessary action. The bookings were made in accordance with the telegram reproduced below which was received in this Office at 3.55 p.m. on Thursday, 20th March, 1969 :

"FROM SOLE ADMINISTRATOR NEW BUSSA


TO: SECMIIGOV IBADAN

FOUR MEMBERS INTERNATIONAL OBSERVER TEAM ARRIVING
IBADAN ABOUT 5 PM 20TH MARCH 1969 FROM ILORIN X
GRATEFUL ARRANGE ACCOMMODATION FOR 20TH NIGHT
ONLY X "

303

2. The names of the observers concerned are :

1. General A. Raab - Sweden
2. Major L. Nasstrom - Sweden
3. Mr. T. Kumanek - Poland
4. Lt. M. Byczy - Poland.


(E. S. Sorinade),
for Secretary to the Military
Government.



first visit
of p.286

pent the
General R
a courtes
d I told

ll be con
l, if so,

21/3/69.

Ref. above and your subsequent
instruction, the team called on H.T.
12.30 pm as arranged, please.

24/3

PA
2/2/69

305
With Compliments of

The American Consulate

P.M.B. 5221
IBADAN

Tel. 24101

Dear Peter,

P. 306 Here is a copy of the
telegram I read you reporting
an editorial in the New York
Times of March 17th. It's
a little faint in places but
still, I hope, readable.

Sincerely,

Curt

COPY OF U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

BT

UNCLAS STATE 242732

SUBJECT: 8 NY TIMES EDITORIAL -- MARCH 17

1. NYTIMES CARRIES EDITORIAL MARCH 17 HEADED "TO HALT BIAFRAN STARVATION. PROF. KC. CLYDE FERGUSON JR. SHOULD PRESS BIAFRA'S LEADERS FOR ONE THING ABOVE ALL WHEN HE VISITS UMUAHIA THIS WEEK AS PRESIDENT NIXON'S NIGERIAN CIVIL WARR RELIEF COORDINATOR: ACCEPTANCE OF PLAN TO USE OBILAGU AIRSTRIP FOR MASSIVE DAYTIME FOOD AIRLIFT.

2. THIS MOST PRACTICAL CURRENT PLAN FOR MEETING EXPLODING GENERAAL STARVATION PROBLEM BIAFRA. IT WAS URGED ON BOTH SIDES IN FEBRUARY BY REP ALLARD LOWENSTEIN OF NY AND ACCEPTED NEARLY MONTH AGO BY NIGERIA. BIAFRA HAS MADE NO OFFICIAL RESPONSE TO DATE.

3. FOR MONTHS EXPERTS HAVE WARNED DAYTIME AIRLIFT OR LAND RELIEF CORRIDOR WOULD BE IMPERATIVE HEAD OFF MASS STARVATION BIAFRA. NIGHT RELIEF FLIGHTS INTO ULI HAVE KEPT BIAFRA PROTEIN DEFICIENCY WITHIN TOLERABLE LIMITS, BUT PROBLEM RAPIDLY BECOMING ONE OF GENERAL STARVATION FROM ACUTE SHORTAGE CALORIC AND CARBOHYDRATE D.91. WHEN BIAFRA CONTROLLED OBILAGU, MOJUKWU PROPOSED RESERVING AIRSTRIP FOR RELIEF, BUT NIGERIA REJECTED THIS BECAUSE TROOPS WERE ADVANCING IN AREA. BIAFRA REJECTED ALL OTHER PROPOSALS FOR DAYTIME AIRLIFTS AND LAND CORRIDORS, PROFESSING SEE NIGERIAN MILITARY ADVANTAGES IN EACH.

4. SOME BIAFRANS SAY NIGERIA ACCEPTED NEW OBILAGO PLAN FEB 22 ONLY BECAUSE BIAFRAN FORCES WERE ABOUT CAPTURE AIRSTRIP BUT THIS HAS NOT OCCURRED. FED TROOPS REMAIN IN CONTROL

UNCLASSIFIED

Classification

BUT AIRSTRIP ONLY FEW MILES FROM FRONT AND THUS PROBLEM TRUCKING FOOD INTO BIAFRAN TERRITORY WOULD BE RELATIVELY EASY. PROPOSAL WOULD ALLOW INSPECTION FOOD, MEDICINES BY BOTH SIDES OR SPECIALISTS ACCEPTABLE BOTH. INTERNATIONAL RELIEF AGENCIES WOULD TRUCK SUPPLIES INTO BIAFRA ALONG A SAFETY ROAD.

5. BY TRUMPETING ITS ACCEPTANCE AND MINICOMI G LOWENSTEIN, NIGERIA MADE BIAFRAN ACQUIESCENCE MORE DIFFICULT AND EMBARRASSED CONGRESSION, WHO HAD WORKED DISCREETLY BEHIND SCENES. BUT FERGUSON MUST IMPRESS ON OJUKWU THIS NOT A VALID REASON FOR REJECTING ONLY PRACTICAL PROPOSAL FOR MEETING A FULL DIMENSIONS STARVATION PROBLEM.

6. FLAT BIAFRAN REFUSAL WILL PERSUADE MANY OJUKWU WILLING EXPLOIT MISERY HIS PEOPLE FOR POLITICAL ENDS. IN EXISTING CIRCUMSTANCES IT WILL ALSO MAKE FERGOUSON'S MISSION OF MAXIMIZING AND COORDINATING AMERICAN RELIEF EFFORTS ALMOST MEANINGLESS FOR BIAFRA.

List of members of the International Observer T
visiting the Western State from Tuesday, 28th
January, 1969 to Wednesday, 29th January, 1969.

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